What Do We Already Know About Processes by Which Individuals and Organizations Respond to Hazards?

Michael K. Lindell Hazard Reduction & Recovery Center Texas A&M University

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Warning Channels

I Types

- Print: newspapers, magazines, brochures
- Electronic: commercial radio and television, *telephone, route alert (broadcast from a moving vehicle), tone alert radio, siren, *internet
- Face-to-face (*dyadic conversation or group presentation)
 *Channels for peer networks

I Characteristics

 Dissemination rate and precision, penetration of normal activities, message specificity/distortion, sender and receiver requirements, and feedback (receipt verification).

Warning Channels

I Each channel has advantages and disadvantages.

- Channels that provide the fastest dissemination often provide the least information (e.g., mechanical sirens).
- I People differ in their channel access and preferences.
- I Public officials typically use *multiple* warning channels in disasters to ensure that all those in the risk area receive a warning.
- I Peers relay information (informal warning systems)

The Warning Network Model for Remotely Detected Events





In some disasters, all warnings come from peers—friends, relatives, neighbors, or coworkers.



Protective Action Decision Model



Warning Source Characteristics

Types

- Authorities (government, scientists, industry)
- News media (print, broadcast, internet)
- Peers (friends, relatives, neighbors, coworkers)

I Characteristics

- Expertise
- Trustworthiness/honesty
- Protection responsibility

Perceptions of Stakeholder Characteristics for Earthquakes



Perceptions of Stakeholder Characteristics for Water Contamination



Perceptions of Stakeholder Expertise for Multiple Hazards



Warning Message Content (Recommended)

- I Source (if not otherwise identified)
- I Threat
 - Hazard agent (type, specific threats, and potential impacts)
 - Affected population (personal risk)
- I Recommended household response actions
- I Official response actions
 - Agency/organizational response actions completed, in progress, and planned
 - Sources of official assistance
 - Sources of further official information

PADM Decision Heuristics

I Threat

- Risk identification: "Is there a real threat?"
- Risk assessment: "Do I need to take protective action?"

I Protective action

- Protective action search: "What can be done to achieve protection?"
- Protective action assessment/selection: "What is the best method of protection?"
- Protective action implementation: "Does protective action need to be taken now?"

PADM Decision Heuristics

I Information search

- Information needs assessment: "What additional information do I need?"
- Communication action assessment/selection: "Where and how can I obtain the needed information?"
- Communication action implementation: "Do I need the information now?"

Behavioral Response

I Information seeking

- Contact the original source or an alternate
 - Confirm/contradict existing information
 - Obtain additional information
 - Relay current information
 - Discuss information implications
- I Protective response
 - Type of action (e.g., evacuation, shelter in-place)
 - Timing of action (immediate or delayed)
- I Emotion-focused coping
 - Distraction, denial, self-medication

- I Warning systems are sociotechnical systems that require a *thorough* understanding of the interactions of the
 - Detection system,
 - Dissemination system, and
 - Response system.

- I CMAS is a useful addition to existing warning mechanisms that appears to be
 - High in dissemination precision, penetration of normal activities, message specificity and low in message distortion,
 - Moderately high in dissemination rate and
 - But also high in receiver requirements (which limits coverage of the risk area population), and low in feedback (which limits receipt verification).
- I It can be a useful supplement to other warning mechanisms that provides diversity and redundancy in the warning system.

- I Diverse and redundant communication devices can minimize the number of information isolates.
- I However, they also can produce confusing and apparently conflicting messages unless the timing of message dissemination is carefully coordinated.

- I Informal warning networks
 - Supplement official warning networks, but
 - Introduce systematic and random errors into the dissemination process.
- I People's perceptions of information validity are substantially affected by the
 - Identity of the information source, and
 - Familiarity of the hazard.

- I The *minimum* message content
 - Identifies a credible source of authoritative information, and
 - Provides the *recommended* warning message content (threat, protective action recommendations, and official actions).

Questions?

Public Perceptions of Protective Actions for Hazardous Materials Incidents

