The Department of Defense is developing the means to transform the nation s armed forces to meet future military challenges. For the Navy and Marine Corps, this vision is encompassed in Naval Power 21. Many new war-fighting concepts will be needed to implement this vision, and the ONR has requested the NRC to identify new science and technology opportunities for new naval aviation capabilities to support those concepts. This report presents an assessment of what they imply for naval aviation, an analysis of some capabilities that, if developed, would make a significant contribution to realizing those concepts, and an identification of key technologies in which ONR could invest to achieve those capabilities. In particular, the report focuses on seven key capabilities: multispectral defense, unmanned air operations, hypersonic weapons delivery, fast-kill weapons, heavy-lift air transport, intelligent combat information management, and omniscient intelligence.

The Chemical Weapons Convention requires, among other things, that the signatories to the convention--which includes the United States--destroy by April 29, 2007, or as soon possible thereafter, any chemical warfare materiel that has been recovered from sites where it has been buried once discovered. For several years the United States and several other countries have been developing and using technologies to dispose of this non-stockpile materiel. To determine whether international efforts have resulted in technologies that would benefit the U.S. program, the U.S. Army asked the NRC to evaluate and compare such technologies to those now used by the United States. This book presents a discussion of factors used in the evaluations, summaries of evaluations of several promising international technologies for processing munitions and for agent-only processing, and summaries of other technologies that are less likely to be of benefit to the U.S. program at this time.

A key technical issue for future Air Force systems is to improve their ability to survive. Increased use of stealth technology is proposed by many to be the major element in efforts to enhance survivability for future systems. Others, however, suggest that the high cost and maintenance required of stealth technology make increased speed potentially more productive. To help address this issue, the Air Force asked the NRC to investigate combinations of speed and stealth that would provide U.S. aircraft with a high survival capability in the 2018 period, and to identify changes in R&D plans to enable such aircraft. This report presents a review of stealth technology development; a discussion of possible future missions and threats; an analysis of the technical feasibility for achieving various levels of stealth and different speeds by 2018 and of relevant near-term R&D needs and priorities; and observations about the utility of speed and stealth trade-offs against evolving threats.

Modeling, simulation, and analysis (MS&A) is a crucial tool for military affairs. MS&A is one of the announced pillars of a strategy for transforming the U.S. military. Yet changes in the enterprise of MS&A have not kept pace with the new demands arising from rapid changes in DOD processes and missions or with the rapid changes in the technology available to meet those demands. To help address those concerns, DOD asked the NRC to identify shortcomings in current practice of MS&A and suggest where and how they should be resolved. This report provides an assessment of the changing mission of DOD and environment in which it must operate, an identification of high-level opportunities for MS&A research to address the expanded mission, approaches for improving the interface between MS&A practitioners and decision makers, a discussion of training and continuing education of MS&A practitioners, and an examination of the need for coordinated military science research to support MS&A.

n 2002, the Army asked for proposals for a full-scale pilot plant to destroy chemical weapons at the Pueblo Chemical Depot and, in 2003, for a similar plant for the Blue Grass Army Depot. In both cases, the initial designs proved to be too costly, and redesigns were requested. At the same time, the Army asked the NRC to form committees to review and assess these proposals. This report focuses on the technical aspects, maturity, and schedule of the proposed modified design for the Pueblo facility.

In 2002, the Army asked for proposals for a full-scale pilot plant to destroy chemical weapons at the Pueblo Chemical Depot and, in 2003, for a similar plant for the Blue Grass Army Depot. In both cases, the initial designs proved to be too costly, and redesigns were requested. At the same time, the Army asked the NRC to form committees to review and assess these proposals. This report focuses on the technical aspects, maturity, and schedule for the proposed full intermediate design for the Blue Grass facility, less the supercritical water oxidation process, which was reviewed in a previous report.

In 2003, the Army asked for proposals for a full-scale pilot plant to destroy chemical weapons at the Blue Grass Army Depot using a neutralization process. The initial proposal from Bechtel and Parsons Corporations, using a supercritical water oxidation process (SCWO), proved to be too costly, so the Army asked for a revised proposal. At the same time, the Army asked the NRC to form committees to review and assess this proposal along with one developed for the chemical weapon storage facility in Pueblo, CO. This letter report provides an assessment of the intermediate design proposal of the modified SCWO Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant. The assessment is confined to the technical aspects, maturity, and schedule of the proposed facility.

In 2003, the Defense Intelligence Agency asked the NRC to form a standing committee to help develop study topics about technology warning. One issue that was identified was the growing dependence on foreign suppliers of critical technology as a result of the increase in globalization of economic activity. Two important questions emerged for study: what is the risk of denial of critical products from foreign sources and what must the United States do to assure access to future critical products and technologies? This report presents an assessment addressing those two questions. It also provides an analysis of a strategic approach to manage the consequences of this trend towards increased globalization. Finally, the report offers a set of recommendations to implement this strategy and to increase assurance of access to critical technologies.

The Navy has put forth a new construct for its strike forces that enables more effective forward deterrence and rapid response. A key aspect of this construct is the need for flexible, adaptive command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. To assist development of this capability, the Navy asked the NRC to examine C4ISR for carrier, expeditionary, and strike and missile defense strike groups, and for expeditionary strike forces. This report provides an assessment of C4ISR capabilities for each type of strike group; recommendations for C4ISR architecture for use in major combat operations; promising technology trends; and an examination of organizational improvements that can enable the recommended architecture.