

Unifying Social Frameworks: A Public Workshop

This forum allows conference participants to provide feedback, ask questions, and comment on the material presented.

Session Details:

Start:	August 16, 2010
End:	August 17, 2010
Location:	Washington, D.C.

Agenda:

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1. *Opening Remarks*

1. General Questions
2. General Comments

2. *Monday Morning Session*

Conflict is Local: Mapping the Sociocultural Terrain

3. Questions for Dr. Patton
 - 3.1. The call to field SOCINT solutions presumes that solutions exist and that the research phase is complete. Is this really the case? What are the subdomains in which (1) tools are ready for fielding? Which subdomains require deep research prior to fielding solutions?
 - 3.2. what, exactly, do you mean by a 'solution'?
 - 3.3. Is SocInt indeed a new ideo?

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- 3.4. Training soldiers to do SocInt
- 3.4.1. *How can we train all armed forces personnel engaging in another culture to engage in sociocultural intelligence? Has there been such a training method developed?*
- 3.5. So, exactly what sort of information would be most useful to those on the ground? What do they need to know?
- 3.6. Operators are often extremely smart. As actors on the ground, aren't they gathering information that is intensely valuable for decision making? Rather than bring in sociocultural experts, why not leverage their learning more effectively?
- 3.7. I agree about the value of analysis and data collected in theater by operators who "are there." But how can we collect field data in denied and/or extremely dangerous zones? Will local people give data to collectors who are "occupiers"?
- 3.8. Please address the guiding question - what sociocultural factors must be understood to achieve military success in conflict environments - AND what are the observables - the data? and how can we collect that data?
- 3.9. which US Government partners or on-the-ground partners would best potentially serve socially-cultural data collection

4. Questions for Dr. Chen

- 4.1. What system do you use to decide whether a website or message board qualifies as a "dark web" site or is excluded from being classified as a "dark web" site?
- 4.2. Dr. Chen examines the subset of terrorists and criminals who use the internet. How representative of the general target population (all terrorists, criminals) is this group?
- 4.3. How reliable are Dark Web models of social links? How is reliability/validity measured?
- 4.4. How does one get access to the Dark Web database?
- 4.5. How do you identify hate, and violence in a text, or message?
- 4.6. Can Dark Web identify the most critical or imminent threats?

5. Questions for Dr. Kennedy

- 5.1. How much of these concepts do you feel apply to the youth of countries outside of the US? In other words, how much do you think the US group culture has affected other countries?
 - 5.1.1. *I think the core ideas here - small number of the most extreme offenders, group dynamics, the importance of norms and narratives, etc. - are pretty universal. The particular group dynamics and norms involving honor culture are also pretty common. I've in fact seen those operating in remarkably similar ways in a number of countries.*
- 5.2. Do people on the ground need SOCINT as Mr. Patton defined it, or do people on the ground have SOCINT and need to be able to better apply it?
 - 5.2.1. *I don't know enough about the situation on the ground to answer this. I do absolutely believe that those on the ground need SOCINT as Mr. Patton defined it.*
- 5.3. The method presented here addresses extremists (e.g., murderers). Dr. Chen's work finds strong effects about extremists (i.e., low recruiting rates for hate + violence). Is it sufficient to operate only at the level of the extreme? Are there predictors or moderates or future generations we should address?
 - 5.3.1. *I know that in the settings in which I work, people have tried very hard to find those predictors, and failed. There can be very large numbers of "at risk," with*

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very few who actually cross over to commit the most extreme acts. Even amongst the most extreme - gang members, for example - very few will ever shoot or kill anybody. So the prediction and prevention projects have just not worked very well.

5.4. comment, not question: a lot of the data of this type is collected in a military environment in the form of 'atmospherics' and other types of information collected by guys on the ground. among others, issues are how they store and transmit that data (huge question) so those of us not in theater can access it as we have no direct access to the front line guys. since communication of out-of-context data (and data with temporal lag) is problematic, not sure how to make this happen

5.5. You refer to community narratives which seems important, but...

5.5.1. *Is there a single community narrative, or multiple narratives that might be competing? How do you handle multiple narratives if they conflict?*

5.5.2. *There are always competing narratives, but typically a few predominate, and there are only one or two that do the most damage. So you deal with those. It's often only necessary to deal with a part of the narrative - one can say, almost all of what you believe is true, and we honor it ("the police have historically been our oppressor"), but this final conclusion ("the police are trying to destroy us today") is wrong*

5.6. Given the clear difficulty of developing a unified social framework that meets every occasion and need, might it not be better to train and educate a large body human and social cultural analyst?

5.6.1. *Yes. What's needed is people who can go to ground, as Kerry Patton described, and draw on lots of existing disciplines to make sense of what's going on, with some very practical goals in mind.*

5.7. This idea of a small number of players dominating the behavior is common - distribution of wealth, size of cities, frequency of long vs short words etc. One generic mechanism that leads to this is "winner take all"/"rich get richer" dynamics. Might there a "violent get more violent" sort of mechanism underlying these distributions, and could that suggest an intervention strategy?

5.7.1. *I believe that there are some positive feedback loops that operate, yes. That would absolutely suggest intervening early in such cycles. I think it's also true that a lot of such feedback cycles have a natural ceiling, no matter what interventions are or aren't made: the stuff we're talking about is so extreme that people age out of it, die, get locked up, are controlled by their peers, or just decide it's a bad idea. There's great ethnography around the crack epidemic, for example, that says younger people, even drug dealers, looked at what crack was doing to people around them and decided it was just stupid to use it or to behave violently, and norms against those things emerged and were enforced.*

5.8. How do you identify credible people with a "connection to the real world" to act as information gatherers and messengers. In many cases, the efforts to identify these people have resulted in them being labelled as "collaborators" and their effectiveness compromised.

5.8.1. *We find that in every community there are already people articulating the norms that need to be emphasized. We simply work with them in ways that they're comfortable with. It matters a great deal what work is being done. Those people would not work with us to put gang members in prison (collaboration). They will work with us to say, don't kill people, and with law enforcement to tell gang*

members, here's what law enforcement plans to do, and how to keep yourself from getting caught up in it.

5.9. A caution is necessary in relating the dialogues to led to decreased crime/violence domestically to the ongoing deradicalization/disengagement programs overseas. Many of these programs deo't really do any deradicalization, they focus on risk management.

5.9.1. *If the point is that what I was talking about doesn't do "deradicalization," I think that's not entirely true. They do, for example, explicitly challenge the norms and street codes that drive the violence.*

6. General Questions

6.1. How does one reliably distinguish between friend and foe in conflict environments?

6.2. In a perfect world, what types of data would like that you currently can not access

6.3. How does one assess the risk of using the "wrong" information in one's attempt to understand local sociocultural knowledge

6.4. How does one filter the critical data from all sociocultural data that can be or could be collected?

6.5. Do groups turn susceptible members into killers; or do people who are violent join groups? Which is the direction of causation?

6.5.1. *Armies and terrorist organizations do turn recruits into violence-doers. However, violent people also seek out groups. There is not a single direction of causality.*

6.6. Are we allowing our societal drive to encode and automate something that cannot be realistically encoded for computer manipulation?

6.7. The workshop is about unifying social frameworks. We want to obtain socio cultural data to achieve sociocultural understanding. No one has aritculated to what end. Why do we want to achieve sociocultural understanding. Why is culture the new answer? Why are we isolating sociocultural considerations? If we isolate it, do we think we can better effect it? What are we seeking to effect through sociocultural understanding?

6.7.1. *Roberts asked this question when someone else was logged in audrey.roberts2@us.army.mil*

6.8. How do we keep sociocultural data and knowledge from being "just interesting" for the ground commander , but ensure it is relevant for the warfighter and ground commanders. Not all sociocultural information is operationally relevant.

6.8.1. *Roberts asked this question when someone else was logged in audrey.roberts2@us.army.mil*

6.9. Networks and impact players have been discussed as if they were static things up until this point in the workshop. How do you account for social change that often happens very quickly? Doesn't this atomatically skew the data? What is the shelf life of sociocultural data?

6.9.1. *Roberts asked this question when someone else was logged in audrey.roberts2@us.army.mil*

6.10. If you are trying to develop sociocultural data and yet the sociocultural domain is incredibly dynamic, how do you reconcile this?

6.10.1. *Roberts asked this question when someone else was logged in audrey.roberts2@us.army.mil*

6.11. What about the exception? The outlier? Different panelists and audience memebers have stated "criminals are creatures of habit", "every villager knows

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the Taliban in their village," "honor codes".... These are not absolute things. What about the person who plants an IED for money because he has no diesel fuel to pump water to irrigate his wheat? Is he an insurgent? Is there a temporal dimension we can map where participation in an insurgency ebbs and flows?

- 6.11.1. *Roberts asked this question when someone else was logged in audrey.roberts2@us.army.mil*
- 6.12. Patton and Kennedy posit that the importance of listening cannot be understated. Certain people seem to have the ability to do this. It isn't often trained, but as Patton argues, it can be trained. What about after you listen to people on the ground in Afghanistan? What do you do with it? How does it get back to the decision makers? How do we prevent it from being lost in the database blackhole that is Afghanistan?
- 6.12.1. *A productive field of research has been in identification of the characteristics of a person who is able to successfully interact with a variety of cultures. For example, characteristics include tolerance for uncertainty, flexibility and openness, willingness to engage, etc. Listening is necessary but not sufficient.*
- 6.13. When responding to a multi-dimensional problem, isn't it true that a set of multi-dimensional strategies are necessary that deal with security/tactical issues (ala David Kennedy's talk) as well as addressing the perceived socio-economic and political grievances that caused the individuals/groups involved to be motivated to engage in collective violence?
- 6.14. What I find interesting is the discussion of whether this "grand data challenge" is ever do-able or even wise to pursue. I think that the specific problem-specific area approach has some merit. With our "WOG" interagency, comprehensive plans - we are trying to do everything... simultaneously ... so we miss the chance to do any of it well. And errors/mistakes - like when you're doing a math problem - then affect how "right" you can be at subsequent stages.
- 6.15. It was mentioned several times but I believe that self-awareness is key to interacting with other cultures. You can be an 'expert' on another culture but if you are not aware of your own biases and culture background and how these will influence your interactions with others you are missing an important piece of information.

7. Additional Comments

7.1. The universalistic fallacy

- 7.1.1. *The investigations described by Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Patton were phenomenal, but should people assume that any method / strategy / technique gained from working with communities in the U.S. automatically generalize to other cultures? Is there any risk in ending up committing the universalistic fallacy? Do communities function in the same way in the U.S., Afghanistan, and Iraq? Are the cultural norms about violence and groups the same in all cultures? Possibly not...*
- 7.1.2. *It seems to me that relevance to counterinsurgency is higher than to countering al Qaeda groups specifically.*
- 7.1.3. *This seems to be a critical point. What are their cultural norms and attitudes about violence? When faced with violence, what is the typical reaction of local leaders and other key stakeholders?*
- 7.1.4. *Treating terrorism as similar in kind doesn't fit with the facts. That being said, Kennedy's point that trying to start by building a universal model won't work is a good point.*

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7.2. Example of the challenge:

7.2.1. *Here sia n article that appreared today that relates to teh challene at hand. SO how does what we heard this morning help here? AFGHAN FORMER MILITANTS REJOIN INSURGENCY Fighters in Herat defect after government fails to fulfill promises of work and development. By Zia Ahmadi Militants in Herat province of eastern Afghanistan who laid down their weapons in response to government offers of aid and amnesty are rejoining the insurgency after officials failed to deliver on their promises. A senior security official told IWPR that about half the 1,000 militants who had surrendered in the last year were now back fighting against the government. Both the Afghan government and the international community have made it a priority to persuade members of the Taliban and allied armed groups to defect, and this was the focus of a "peace jirga" or assembly hosted by President Hamid Karzai in the capital Kabul in June. Efforts have focused on winning over small groups in return for protection from legal investigations, the provision of jobs and reconstruction projects for their home areas. However, in a telephone interview with IWPR, Nur Gul, a Taliban commander who surrendered with his 20 armed men last October, said none of the promises he received beforehand had been translated into action. Nur Gul, 38, was originally part of the Jamiat-e Islami faction, which fought against the Taliban in northern Afghanistan in the Nineties. But then he switched allegiances and joined his former Taliban enemies, before being persuaded to come over to the government side. "The day we surrendered, the Italian PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team] gave each of us one sack of rice, a can of cooking oil and a winter jacket," he said. "They showed this on TV, which we found very humiliating, as most people might think we'd been fighting only for some rice or cooking oil." Nur Gul said his men were being harassed by Afghan security officers, had not been given jobs and had seen no reconstruction work. "We thought we had an independent government, but [now] we realise it's the foreigners who have the bigger say in this country, not the Afghan government," he said. Now he is back with the Taliban. "This time I will fight against the government and the foreign occupying forces to the last drop of blood," he said. Arbab Zaman Gul, 40, from the Keshk Kuhna district, was a commander in Hezb-e Islami, an insurgent group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and allied with the Taliban, surrendered to Herat provincial police together with his 30 fighters this May. But he too has returned to violence, accusing the government of reneging on its promises. "After we surrendered and received a letter of protection from the government, four of my men were killed within the next ten days," he said. He accuses "government elements" of the killings. "The reason we surrendered was not in order to be harassed or tortured by government security forces, but to help restore peace and security," Zaman Gul said. "We wanted our area to be rebuilt and we wanted job opportunities to be created so that we would have a chance to get work. But the government has reneged on all its commitments. "So we have had to go out, pick up our weapons and fight them again. If the government continues with its lies, not only will no one want to surrender, but the number of people opposing it will increase. Mullah Mustafa, a former Taliban commander who surrendered and joined the peace process along with his 50 fighters, told IWPR that he had not yet returned to the armed struggle. But he warned that if the government failed to deliver on promises, his men would take up arms again. Officials acknowledge that there have been problems with the reconciliation process, pointing to a lack of resources and the conflicting priorities*

of different government agencies. The effort to persuade militants to turn away from violence has been led by the National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission, NIPRC, founded in 2005. Sharif Mojaddidi, who heads the NIPRC's division for western Afghanistan, says between 5,000 to 7,000 insurgents across the country have joined the peace process in the last five years. He said the government provides militants who surrender with letters of protection, and promises them it will create jobs and launch reconstruction efforts in the areas they come from. Mojaddidi acknowledged that some insurgents had gone back to the other side due to budgetary constraints which prevented some pledges being delivered on, and also to what he described as "inattentiveness" on the part of some senior government officials. Herat provincial police chief Mohammad Salim Ehsas said the militants who join the peace process had unrealistic expectations – they wanted reconstruction, job creation and the departure of foreign troops from Afghanistan, all in the very near future. Siawash, a political analyst in Herat province, said he believed that most of those who join the peace process were simply armed criminals, rather than part of the opposition. Once they realised they were no longer able to make a living out of crime, he said, they came to the government and claimed to be militants willing to surrender. Then they would turn back to crime again. According to Siawash, the real opposition has an ideological agenda which makes it harder to persuade members to surrender just to get money or jobs. A high-ranking official for the western security zone, speaking on condition of anonymity, estimated that out of the more than 1,000 armed men who had handed in their weapons over the last year, "500 are back fighting the government and the international forces". He said those who had resumed militant activity mainly came from the Bala Murghab and Qades districts of Badghis province, and the Keshk Kuhna, Guzra, Adreskan and Shindand districts of Herat province. The official was among those who have accused officers of the National Directorate of Security, NDS, of harassing former militants and alienating them from the reconciliation process. Even though men who surrendered were generally issued with a letter of protection, the NDS frequently interrogated them. General Ekramuddin Yawar, chief of police for the western security zone, agreed that intelligence service had put pressure on former militants in an attempt to extract information from them. On some occasions, he said, this had driven the gunmen to defect again. "Some of those who had joined the peace process have gone back... and resumed their activities against Afghan and international security forces," he said. An NDS official in Herat province, who declined to be named, said that the agency had to interrogate those who surrendered in order to identify their associates. He insisted those interrogated were not tortured or imprisoned. Sharif Ahmad, a former militant, said in a telephone interview that NDS questioning had prompted him to go back to the insurgents. "Although I surrendered all the arms I had to the government, I was still put under pressure by NDS officers, who wanted me to hand in more weapons," he said. He said that when he found out that the NDS was going to detain him again, he rejoined the insurgents.

7.3. Useful for military operators: what it takes to acquire local knowledge and to make a sustainable successful intervention.

8. Committee and Presenter Questions

8.1. Will the presentations be made available after the workshop?

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8.1.1. with permission from the presenters, we will post the presentations online after the workshop [cherie,]

3. Monday Afternoon Session

Bridging Sociocultural Gaps in Cooperative Relationships

9. Questions for Dr. Rubinstein

- 9.1. Why aren't we interested in very simple models of culture? That isn't clear to me.
- 9.2. What Level of cultural understanding do warfighters on the ground generally attain?

10. Questions for Dr. Fiske

- 10.1. I get that there are these general principles of social relations in cooperative relations, but how is it that these allow us to predict.
 - 10.1.1. *There are many predictions that can be deduced from a parsimonious description. (See www.rmt.ucla.edu for scores of studies.) What kind of predictions would you like to be able to make?*
- 10.2. How can we train individuals, say American military personnel working in Afghanistan, to quickly figure out which relational model is appropriate in various everyday interactions that they are likely to encounter in their new cultural environment?
 - 10.2.1. ***How can we train individuals, say American military personnel working in Afghanistan, to recognize what relational model they are using, and that it might not be the same?*
 - 10.2.2. *There are cross-cultural consistencies in the modes in which people communicate, constitute, and conduct the respective relational models. See Fiske, A. P. 2004. Four modes of constituting relationships: Consubstantial assimilation; space, magnitude, time and force; concrete procedures; abstract symbolism. In N. Haslam, Ed., Relational Models Theory: A Contemporary Overview pp. 61–146. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.*
- 10.3. I would think that most relationships include multiple aspects of the models you've presented, and that those aspects can be called out or made salient depending on context; i.e., they are dynamic and contingent.
 - 10.3.1. *I think so, too. But there is evidence that most dyads tend to use one default model much of the time.*
- 10.4. Thom Schelling writes that coordination is usually built on "focal points", and these help organize social life. Does this fit in one of your models? (David Laitin)
 - 10.4.1. *I'm not familiar with the focal points idea, so I can't say.*
- 10.5. Are these models contextually bounded? in other words, dont cultures have different relational models used, depending on situation? and can you speak to any of these situational contingencies?
 - 10.5.1. *When, where, how, and when people use each model varies considerably across cultures. Indeed, that's a good way to describe the variations across cultures. Nevertheless, there are some consistencies that allow some predictability -- the use of RMs in particular domains is far from random or arbitrary. We have a paper under R&R that addresses some factors.*
- 10.6. Dr Fiske outlined relational models, all of which were organized around discovery. The interactive piece came when the person who was discovering came to a point where they constituted and then communicated a cooperative model. No where

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in Fiske's presentation did I see a space to extend understanding or discuss what model the discoverer is coming from. The discoverer also constitutes the cooperative model after discovering what model the other party is coming from. Where is the space that the discoverer extends understanding about their own model?

- 10.6.1. *I'm sorry, I don't understand what you mean by 'discovery'? In what sense are the RMs "organized around discovery"?*
- 10.7. Aren't we at risk of imposing external framings on behavior, that perhaps don't correspond to the framings that the population itself claims? If that's the case, from what perspective does one judge the correctness of an explanatory framing?
- 10.7.1. *That is certainly an empirical question. We've done lots of studies using many varied methods. See www.rmt.ucla.edu*

11. Questions for Dr. Carbaugh

- 11.1. I don't understand how your model (these practices have this meaning) is different from stereotypical statements-- can you please clarify?
 - 11.1.1. *The claim being made is about a specific sociocultural practice, such as, this practice, when active, has this shape and these meanings. The claim is not that any one person, or any one group, must do something because they are a member of that group. The latter is stereotyping; the former requires no determinant link between individuals and actions.*
- 11.2. Can you please say more about the "blue helmet" operation in Northern Ghana? According to DPKO there is not, nor has there been, a peacekeeping mission there. So, what kind of mission is it?
 - 11.2.1. *The example drew was intended to illustrate how people in local situations "position" the outsiders who have come to assist them. How local codes create identities for "outsiders" is crucial to understand for that identity constrains one's actions within a local code.*
 - 11.2.2. *The example was intended to illustrate how people in local situations "position" those outsiders who have come to assist them. Sometimes this local coding of the "helpers" seriously constrains the ability of those placed in that position to help; sometimes not. In any event, in addition to knowing the local code of life, one should know the local position one is put in when trying to help others.*
- 11.3. Your emphasis on localization of operations makes me wonder if it makes any sense to ask questions "unifying" social theory and frameworks, and the relevance of such frameworks to real-world problem solving.
 - 11.3.1. *I am not sure what is meant when we have discussed a "unifying theory." The approach I take is, well, integrative, in that it allows attention to a variety of sectors such as security, health, and the environment; it is also integrative in that it allows knowledge to be built which is of relevance to humanitarian, development, military, and other operations. If I were pressed, I would opt in favor of multiple modes, over a "unifying" one.*
- 11.4. Can you quickly discover the local code during military engagement?
 - 11.4.1. *I commented on this briefly in surprise of what can be learned through carefully selected concepts and methods, with a skilled team. I am hopeful that we can study "the available rules of engagement" in local scenes, since in some sense, these vary by social and cultural system.*
- 11.5. How is Cultural Discourse Analysis different from traditional anthropological fieldwork and interpretation a la Geertz' Deep Play?

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11.5.1. *I am happily indebted to Geertz and his studies, the "deep play" essay of the cockfight being, in my view, a classic. I use some of Geertz's ideas like "lexical anthithesis," "flow of discourse," the "said" of symbolic forms, and so on. And we have developed Geertz's ideas in our studies to focus explicitly on communication practices, cultural discourses, ways of speaking/thinking, and a fine-grained descriptive, interpretive, comparative, and critical theory. We now have a well-developed "communication theory of culture" indebted partly to Geertz, and also to Sapir, WHorf, Hymes, Kenneth Burke and others. The approach brings practical life into view, and makes it scrutable for a variety of missions.*

11.6. Do you use any quantitative disource analysis tools to find out what "code words" people in a particular community uses to discuss a certain issue?

11.6.1. *Yes, we do word/phrase counts, but do not rely exclusively on them. Repetition of words can tell us some things, but the frequency count alone does not necessarily capture the qualitative judgment of salience, or power, from the vantage of participants.*

12.General Questions

12.1. *How does one deal with a disruptive or dificult party , who perhaps does not want to see things move to a post-conflict environment?*

12.1.1. *You need to understand their social motives. Antagonism, like cooperation, is socially motivated.*

12.1.2. *We need to know what this individual gets by continuing the conflict, what relations are continued in what ways, what actions are continied, expressed reasons for continuing the conflict and so on. With this knowledge, perhaps also we discover better ways to proceed.*

12.2. *How would warfighters and commanders implement your ideas?*

12.2.1. *If they want to understand what people are doing and how people will respond to their actions, they need to explicitly or implicity understand the relational models people are using.*

12.2.2. *Cultural Discourse Theory provides a framework for investigating social situations, local actions, and cultural meanings. This may be of value to those who want to work with people in any community.*

12.2.3. *Hearing General Flynn today, it strikes me that training personnel in methods derived from frameworks like Cultural Discourse Theory could be helpful in eliciting necessary information to avoid problems like the school debacle that the General described.*

12.3. *What do you need that you don't have (parallel to this morning's panel)?*

12.4. *The previous session analyzed behavior at the margins, i.e., it examined murderers. This session analyzes behavior around the mode, e.g., it examines farmers. Both sessions focus on discovering the models by which the populace makes meaning. Can we really use the same standards and methods for analyzing these two populations? Should we invest equally in both? Where will we find the higher return on investment?*

12.4.1. *While there may be some overlap in methods, I think the questions, concepts, and methodologies will vary to a large degree. In order to know patterns of practices and their meanings, one needs intensive field data, and various kinds of analyses (descriptive, interpretive, comparative). Focusing on qualities of social interaction like this is different than measures of central tendencies. The qualities gained are depth of knowledge in local meanings, and local strategic actions;*

gaining this type of knowledge seems well worth the investment, if we want to work with people in ways they recognize as significant and important to them.

- 12.5. Would the creation of SocInt aid in bridging sociocultural gaps?
- 12.6. If context is constructed to address the problem at hand (just as memory is largely constructed), how can we influence the construction of context in ways that benefit us?
 - 12.6.1. *By knowing the local codes which are used, and presumed, by people in their contexts, we can know better how people are creating the contexts in which we work.*
- 12.7. How can we start talking about social models in this forum if we have not established what is pertinent to the DoD decision makers? We must first understand what socio-cultural information we lack the look at how we can model or categorize it.
- 12.7.1. *Yes, agreed. Several threads of our discussion point to the importance of focusing investigations, and identifying the question(s) to which we intend to respond. This is crucial, I think.*
- 12.8. The qualitative approaches presented by this panel are critical to consider if the intent is to discover the "native's point of view" whether for cooperation or for discovering what compels people to support an insurgency. What is generalizable is the methodology. This could be incorporated into defense academies' curricula and operator training.

13. Additional Comments

- 13.1. Just A Note: It would be most useful to place the techniques, methods, models, frameworks, best practices, etc. (that we discovery over the course of this workshop) on a continuum, describing when each them could or would be applied within a military mission. (Some of the comments/questions from the audience suggested that some of the techniques discussed in the 1st panel were contradictory, when in fact the would compliment each other.) It would also be very useful to determine who would be the primary users of the techniques, methods, frameworks, etc and for what purpose. Some methods are great tools for obtaining "situation" data and other methods would be great for engaging indigenous groups.
- 13.2. It is not clear how this work will inform formal models such as those being developed in the CTTSO program for HSCB.

14. Committee and Presenter Questions

4. Tuesday Morning Session

Building Partner Capacity with Sociocultural Awareness

15. Questions for Dr. Sanchez-Burks

- 15.1. Your data are divided between "Americans" and "Latinos." Could you please say more about your samples. Are the "Latinos" not from the US, that is not "American"? Are all there regional differences among the "American" in your sample, for instance?
 - 15.1.1. *Similarly, are the "Chinese" and "Asians" sampled from Asia? If they were from America, how might immersion in American culture have influenced the results?*

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- 15.2. over and underestimation of group emotion-- what is the DV that gives you the result that to overestimate positive emotion is most dangerous
- 15.3. Are the data from conflict and performance reporting self reports of what would happen, or empirical observations of what happens? In other words, is this about what people say they do or about what they actually do?
- 15.4. How does the paper doll method really test ability to "read" a crowd? You mentioned that real groups don't pose for photos. Why only .25 seconds?
- 15.5. How do you account for differences in languages in how emotion is conceived, an evaluated? A similar question concerns how emotions are to be expressed, to what degree, in what ways?
- 15.6. What explains, given your point that ignorance of relations harms group importance, we see, on the macro level, US workers and in teams (at Microsoft, at Cisco) have very high rates of productivity?
- 15.7. How can these findings be made operational for cross-cultural teams? What is the variance on the results? Which cultural form dominates when you have a mixed cultural team?

16. Questions for Dr. Kitayama

- 16.1. Euro-Americans are culturally programmed to devote high amounts of cognitive resources to identifying differences, according to your study. Does this extend to all situations? Could some forms of "racism" be attributed to this phenomenon?
- 16.2. Reality is culturally defined
 - 16.2.1. *Is there a good, readable discussion of this for the lay person?*
 - 16.2.2. *Richard Nisbett has an accessible book, entitled "Geography of thought."*

17. General Questions

- 17.1. How important is interpersonal attraction or identification to trust building?
- 17.2. how do both your results (specific cognitive and emotional differences across cultures) translate into any advice for military trying to build capacity in other countries?
- 17.3. The guiding question asks about "What socio-cultural knowledge will enable DOD personnel to be more effective....?" Do you think that some socio-cultural knowledge and data has a shelf life? How is this determined? There is a very real temporal dimension to validity. This has not yet been discussed. In spaces such as Afghanistan, things change very, very quickly.
- 17.4. Multinational organizations, because of ethics laws in the US or UK, are increasingly attempting to develop organizational cultures that promote western ethics, even while operating in other cultures with different relational approaches that result in different ethical views. Could you envision an approach to training that could reconcile the need to balance "legal" ethics and cultural ethics as applied across organizations with global reach?

18. Additional Comments

- 18.1. Training in cultural awareness, in my humble opinion, should not be based just in specific techniques (i.e., here's how you wave hello in Iraq), but moreover training in an investigative procedure, or framework, that is, how you discover, and/or listen, to what is going on there, in order to identify the cues and codes active among people there.
- 18.2. You are both doing cross-cultural social psychological research. One of the robust findings of social psychology is that the environment can have a very strong

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effect on how people behave (e.g., Stanford prison experiment). Does this suggest a method of creating a way that your findings can be implemented?

18.3. (Type here to submit an idea.)

18.3.1. *I may be the only one but I find the procedure of requiring audience comments through think tank counterproductive and even offensive. If I am going to take the trouble of attending in person I do not want to have to turn my back on discussion to ask a question, I want the sense of interaction with panelists that occurs when one addresses questions orally, I want people knowing I am asking so that those who differ from me or are thinking along the same lines can talk to me during breaks and I want to ask my questions in my own voice rather than have it perhaps incorrectly posed by a moderator. I also don't want the back pain I have from leaning over as I write. I also find it ironic that at this conference which is attempting to be sensitive to cultural and psychological nuance that this procedure is imposed since it enlarges differences between panel and audience and makes those of us in the audience mere spectators. Think tank is an excellent idea for those viewing remotely and for audience members who wish to write extensive comments after the event or during breaks, but it is a serious mistake to impose it as it has been done here and if it is adopted by the NRC it may affect my choice whether to attend future events. I am so negative about what I expect you see as a truly innovative approach, and maybe my views reflect my generational status, but I hope you will take them into account in future planning.*

18.3.2. *R. Lempert*

18.4. Really argues for the criticality of effective cross-cultural competence training tailored for military personnel who will be conducting stability operations.

19. Committee and Presenter Questions

5. Day One Discussion

20. Questions about Day One

20.1. What kinds of education (and training) programs should we be developing to train the next generation of scholars and practitioners to move us forward on these questions?

21. Comments on Day One

21.1. One framework: We need to understand THAT we need to understand sociocultural factors. Then we need to understand WHAT we need to know about those factors (for what purposes). Then we need to understand HOW we acquire and learn those things.

21.1.1. *Seems like we have made good progress on the first stage, made a start on the second, but need to ramp up on the third.*

21.2. It seems that the morning and afternoon sessions are talking past each other. The meaning of model is very diffuse, many definitions have been offered, and without a clear mapping of type of model comments on what data is needed seem unfounded

21.2.1. *One analyst's data is another analyst's model; e.g., a network showing the connections among terrorists engaged in an IED event is viewed by some as data*

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and by other's as a model of the event. How do we create a unified perspective under this condition.

21.3. Most studies show that there is lots of available human socio-cultural data - it is just not organized, reusable, findable. What science is needed to make use of that data? Or, is it quicker, more effective, more scientific to simply collect new data every time we study culture.

21.3.1. *I don't think it makes sense, or is usually feasible, to collect new data on large culture areas. Just consult with anthropologists and regional experts. However, we will always need all possible current data on specific communities, groups, and persons. {Alan Fiske}*

21.4. Are we perhaps asking too much when we attempt to develop a model of human behavior, particularly of human behavior of another culture? Do we run the risk that users of the model will use it in the wrong way? For example, over rely on it than learn not to trust it if it makes the "wrong" decision? How much better would this model be than someone who is adapt at interacting with others?

21.4.1. *To understand other cultures, it takes far more than simply a sensitive personality and social adeptness. It's much like mechanical repair skill. To repair an engine, one needs more than merely mechanical adeptness; knowledge of the engineering principles of internal combustion, together with practical experience repairing motors, is all-important. {Alan Fiske}*

21.5. Training-We take 2 years to train a person to speak and communicate in another language. How long will it take to become adapt in another culture? The speakers are correct. If this is important, it will be trained. Right now the focus at the tactical level is on kinetic skills. We need to decide if non-kinetic skills are a requirement. If they are, we need to find the time to train them. Training will not be successful if it in the form of lectures. This type of learning involves practicing and applying these skills; making mistakes and learning how to adapt and change our own behavior. It doesn't happen quickly for most of us.

21.5.1. *I agree completely. However, I would add that a lot of complementary knowledge can be gained from readings and lectures about the nature of cultural variations, practices, and institutions. For example, one could read about honor and shame complexes. But certainly real experience learning first-hand in the field is invaluable. {Alan Fiske}*

21.6. Many panelists mentioned the importance of data and data collection. But rarely was it mentioned what theory and methodology drives data collection and to what precise purpose---other than "just" information---the data is collected?

21.7. The idea put forward by Dr. McNamara that modeling is about forecasting is antiquated. During the last decade researchers have elaborated and applied in great detail alternative purposes for modeling, including CSS, serving a variety of functions, such as: Pattern prediction (Grimm et al. 2008); disambiguation (Moss 2008a, 2008b); explanations (Hedström 2005; Read 2002); stakeholder integration (Barreteau et al. 2003). I think this discussion is not necessary anymore.

21.8. Question for Dr. Sargent: What if qualitative data informs the design of causal relationships?

21.9. Question for Dr. Turnley: One problem we have in ABM is how to translate the evidence (data) into rules guiding agent behavior. Do you think theory could help informing this process?

6. Keynote Address - Major General Michael T. Flynn

Making a Difference in Afghanistan: Technology, knowledge, and intelligence in an active sociocultural environment

22.Questions for General Flynn

- 22.1. There is a lot of anecdotal data on the effectiveness of human terrain teams and "atmospherics" programs. What performance measurement and evaluation processes are you putting place to improve these programs?
- 22.2. You stated that speedy intelligence is more valuable than deliberate intelligence. Can you specify the types of intel that benefit from speed vs. deliberation?
- 22.2.1. *It seems that the success of this model requires a J2/3 construct - combining traditional J3 ops, J2 analysis, and even J5 strategic planning functions. How does the PME process prepare operators (versus intel officers) for 21st century conflicts?*
- 22.3. Can you further elaborate on the concept of "reach back" and its role?
- 22.4. Can you comment on the status of the training program for analysts you created in the aftermath of the Fixing Intel report? What training do you wish people had before coming to theater?
- 22.5. you mentioned that you are modifying a find/feel / finish model (developed for kinetic contexts) for a non-kinetic context, can you speak more about how you are changing this model to be more appropriate to non-kinetic activities?
- 22.6. Can you tell us about the Afghan Mission Network? Is it classified? Is it accessible via SIPR or JWICS?
- 22.7. You mentioned a VTC today that is open to academics and others that can help provide "richness." How do our workshop attendees participate and help you with those VTC?
- 22.8. What one technology do you most need in the HSCB area?
- 22.9. General Flynn, kudos to you for the Fixing Intel report. It's excellent.

23.Additional Comments

7. Tuesday Afternoon Session 1

The Art of Sociocultural Persuasion

24.Questions for Dr. Brett

- 24.1. How can we train armed forces personnel to learn what specific strategies they can use in the varied negotiation situations that they might encounter in an honor culture like Afghanistan, from the most mundane (e.g., negotiating the price of a good or service) to the most important (e.g., negotiating the transfer of control of a town)?
- 24.2. With the concept of "face," you conveyed how the receiver of the negative message fixed the problem. What was the exchange with the conveyer of the bad message prior to having it solved. In other words what "face saving," did the person do with the American before solving the problem?
- 24.3. What do we need to know about how to handle that aspect?

25.Questions for Dr. Dillard

- 25.1. how does one 'disrupt a narrative'? what does that mean? what would it look like?

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25.1.1. *One way is to appeal to other stories or "facts" that are incompatible with the narrative. Ideally these other stories or facts would be ones that are believed by the people you want to influence. You thereby give them reasons (that they can recognize as reasons) for rethinking the narrative they currently hold.*

25.2. So, how would you propose disrupting the narrative that suggests that Islam is under attack, that this is a continuation of the crusades, and that "our lands" are occupied by outsiders?

25.2.1. *Probably the only truly convincing way to disrupt that particular narrative is to leave the country. But, that aside, it might be worth exploring the concept of occupation. The term suggests someone who is in place for purely self-interested reasons and who is willing to use force to subdue or subjugate the population. So anything that can be done to counter those ideas would presumably work to counter the occupier narrative. But, it is important to be cognizant of the fact that the occupier narrative can be seen as part of a very abstract story that begins hundreds of years ago. Stories at that level are difficult to unseat because they can be used as an interpretive lens for almost everything. But, repeated efforts to build and sustain positive personal relationships will surely go some distance towards weakening the occupier narrative.*

25.3. How does the identify of the storyteller, and/or the relationship between the storyteller and the receiver, change the effectiveness of the story?

25.3.1. *The storyteller has to have some degree of perceived trustworthiness for the story to be effective. Operationally, that means a relationship in which the hearer believes that the speaker is telling the story for the hearer's benefit not for the speaker's benefit. But, "listen to me for your own good" can be overbearing too (and produce counterpersuasion). Telling just for the sake of telling is often the best approach.*

25.4. Many publications have focused on reframing narratives and their power to influence organizational culture. We are now interested in how to reframe narratives to address our relationship with Islamic cultures and improve security. I was wondering if you had anything to say on new approaches of community-based policing in urban areas of the US plagued by violence and its role in reframing the narrative regarding the role of the police and their relationship with the communities which they serve.

26. Questions for Dr. Burleson

26.1. Does receiving or giving support promote well-being?

26.1.1. *(Type here to submit a comment.)*

26.1.2. *Yes, and there is evidence that both of these are beneficial. That is, LOTS of research documents that the receipt of support promotes well-being. Interestingly, some recent work further indicates that giving support facilitates the well-being of the giver.*

26.2. How can supportive messages be integrated with persuasion?

26.2.1. *We suggest that support and persuasion can be integrated around the idea of "motivational support" - support that is given in the effort to bring about changes in the problematic behavior of another (e.g., excessive drinking).*

27. General Questions

27.1. What types of persuasive techniques lead a message to "stick" (be resistant to decay or change)?

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- 27.2. High and low trust societies will start from different assumptions about who can be persuasive and how. We start from our perspective and ignore the opposites. While we have fundamental behavioral bases, bridging this gap is foundational to persuasion. How are we directly addressing this?
- 27.3. How do you persuade populations that actively do not want to be persuaded? Populations that will resist attempts to persuade them?
- 27.4. How would warfighters and commanders implement your ideas?
- 27.5. How do the panelists view their models for persuasion (or consider effect-based messaging or operations) being used at the tactical, operational and strategic levels? We have been generalizing about "guys on the ground" and "warfighters", but they have different information requirements and will often use information or data differently at different levels.
- 27.6. In work with Asian societies, I have often noticed that Americans have the idea or "general tendency" to assume that Asian women are subservient. This may be true, but they tend to exert a lot of influence on their husbands and families. How do you assess differences in gender in terms of response to "face," and persuasion?
- 27.7. I noticed that there are no African Americans on the panel. Is there a lack of people in these fields. I am curious because the bulk of the forces are minority.
- 27.8. I wonder if the fact that K-12 schools do not always teach culture, geography and problem solving create a problem for training incoming war fighters
- 27.9. Deterrence, Dissuasion, reassurance

27.9.1. Interesting that no one mentioned how the topic plays in creating policies, strategies, and capabilities for deterrence etc.

- 27.10. Is it possible that Mr. Kennedy sees his aspect of a causal model and his model fits within a larger system of models?
- 27.11. Is it possible that from one cultural perspective a model makes sense that from a different cultural perspective that model does not make sense.

28. Additional Comments

29. Committee and Presenter Questions

8. Tuesday Afternoon Session 2

Methods, Tools, Frameworks and Models

30. Questions for Dr. Bevir

- 30.1. What happens to the idea of "cause" in your interpretive system? How do you deal with circumstances (such as those described by Dr. Kennedy yesterday) when agents misunderstand themselves and their motives - where they have "false consciousness?"

30.1.1. I hope you think I answered this question during the Q&A - Mark

31. Questions for Dr. McNamara

- 31.1. You mentioned the training of intuition. Can you expand on the relationship between computational modeling and intuition. These seem to be quite disparate enterprises.

31.1.1. If I said that, I misspoke - or you're thinking of Jessica Turnley?

31.1.2. I don't think I said anything about this - jessica

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32.Questions for Dr. Sargent

33.Questions for Dr. Glicken Turnley

34.General Questions

34.1. Do we need to also consider strengths and weaknesses of aquiring and utilizing relevant data and knowledge at different levels (e.g. tactical, operational, strategic) for different purposes (e.g. training or informing the decision making process)? Feedback, please

34.1.1. *Yes, just as all data are provisional, so we need to approach them with a sense of how provisional they are. I would just add too that our sense of how provisional they are is also something that others might challenge and that we might change our mind about.*

34.1.2. *as i mentioned during the session, i believe agent-based and systems dynamics computational social models in particular are most useful at the strategic level and can probably be of use at the operational. however, i do not thik they can now nor possibly ever will be of use at the tactical level. social network models are a different case, although there are all kinds of caveats and cautions around their use at the tactical level.*

34.2. M&S: Strategic Level

34.2.1. *Can M&S be of used for strategic deterrence? If so, in what manner(s)*

34.2.2. *forecasts have been succeeded by scenario planning to aviod extending the obvious beyond real*

34.2.3. *Social sciences make up theories and find data to fit them too often---Other sciences hypothesize, collect data, modify and conclude into a trheory that fits all data;;this backward strategy of social science hold back its progress..depending on forecasts assumes trends keep on going, but most of life's important events are from disruptions, twists in the road ahead;;thus scenarios are better for getting prepared for future uncertainties*

34.3. It seems to me that all decision-making is fundamentally based on some kind of model--some kind of theory about how the world works that has been condensed down into something cognitively "portable". Perhaps what we need more than caution not to rely on models for tactics is a wider variety of models of the world and causation that we can draw from--more tools for our tool belt. Then, the question would be, how do we select the variation of models to fit a sufficiently large number of potential contexts?

34.3.1. *it is not too much of a stretch to say that most of our thinking is based on conceptual models. we need to be careful to distinguish between conceptual, computational, and other types of models in our discussions. - jessica*

34.4. There is a kind of modeling that has not been discussed - and I think this type is perhaps most salient for developing social and cultural insights. For example, Kenneth Pike has a "model" for tracking all possible sounds humans make in order to produce any language anywhere; when using that "model" we then understand the sounds of Russian, of Finnish, of Scottish english, and so on. We know how the language sounds are similar and different, and so on. His International Phonetic Alphabet, his "etic" model, then, is analagous to the kind of model needed for developing socio-cultural insights, and has, I think, not entered our discussion. Why not?

34.5. One area that was not discussed was "usage models"...how the output of the models will be used / trained mapped to the audience - leadership or on the ground level...this is a critical aspect of the modeling process. This would be a great topic as it maps across both day discussions.

35. Additional Comments

35.1. Models are not models are not models. What is needed to create a typology of models that is useful both for advancing science, promoting a new science of validation, and helping operational users understand what kind or kinds of models they need?

35.1.1. *i agree. i think our comments and questions often blurred the line between conceptual and computational models...and then there are physical models and mathematical models and.... this taxonomy can be created, and then we must be careful in our language use and conversations. - jessica*

36. Committee and Presenter Questions

9. Day Two Discussion

37. Questions about Day Two

37.1. In addition to developing computational and mathematical models, how might social/behavioral sciences in academia support the Defense community?

37.1.1. *Based on the time the DoD has for training soldiers in cultural, it seems like one of the best things academia could do is join with the Army in creating a new mandate for junior high and highschool education in culture for US schools.*

37.2. What social science disciplines and approaches have been underrepresented in understanding human dimensions of defense operations and what might they reasonably contribute?

37.2.1. *the modeling work, oddly, seemed under-represented in terms of the state of the art. In addition, the new work on text-mining for cultural concepts.*

37.3. Has anyone mapped out the questions or decisions that these "data" and models are used to inform?

37.4. What kinds of innovations and/or breakthroughs could participants envision emerging within the HSCB sciences that take advantage of methods for scientific measurement from within the physical/information sciences and the methods for measuring insight/understanding from within the social sciences that have applications beyond training programs?

37.4.1. *A new science of validation designed for socio-cultural models; as opposed to forcing engineering validation metrics.*

37.5. For Allison Abbe - is there any role for culture-specific education before the pre-deployment phase? Would it be valuable for the Armed Forces if personnel are educated about how to act in different cultures to make them more culturally sensitive for their next foreign assignment, if one might materialize?

37.5.1. *this education should probably be done for the american public writ large - before they ever get into the military*

38. Comments about Day Two

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38.1. Just a comment about one part of the summary of Dr. Laitin in which he suggested that Cultural Discourse Analysis, and the study of communication codes, is traditional ethnography. From the view of the presenter, this is disappointing and not the case. While it shares some commitments with traditional ethnography, its theoretical focus on communication practices, its methodology in five distinct phases, its substantive literature, especially that focused on intercultural dynamics - and so on - goes well beyond traditional practices of ethnography, and I would hope this might eventually be noticed.

10. *Summation and Implications*

39. Questions about the Workshop

39.1. There is no discipline that has generated what most of its own specialists, or specialists in other discipline, would consider a unified social framework. There is no unified framework that any meaningful range of disciplines would agree upon. Most social science disciplines have developed very few useful predictive tools, and even fewer that are effective around very particular (immediate/local/tactical) situations. Given that these things are true, what reason is there to think that this process will generate what is desired for support of American engagement in-theatre?

39.2. Rather than looking for unifying frameworks, might it not be more helpful to identify a set of key problems needing attention in-theatre; a set of existing findings and disciplines that would be helpful in addressing them; and people able to help in applying those frameworks to those problems in a way that would be useful to operators?

40. Comments about the Workshop

40.1. I have found that many social scientists (myself included) who are in the DOD/Homeland Security R&D business have been long frustrated by the government's underinvestment in the the SBE sciences and by the demand of our "customers" for technological fixes for the more serious problems they encounter even when the problems have human elements at their core and are unlikely ever to be solved by technology alone. But the appeal of, e.g. a technological device that would identify suicide bombers 100 yards away is irresistible and millions of dollars are spent aiming at such fixes even when they are unlikely to work or, if they work, will be easily circumvented. Thus, it is in some ways a true pleasure to see such attention devoted to what the SBE sciences have to offer the warfighter in a foreign culture and to the overall mission. Moreover, the quality of speakers at this workshop was exceptional, both in the substance of what was presented and the quality of the speakers as presenters. Lots of people did a terrific job in arranging this, and it is a shame that Judee Burgoon could not be present to enjoy the accolades she so richly deserves.

40.1.1. *(Seems to be that one hits return at his peril) To continue the message that ended with my congratulations to the organizers but stopped before I turned to what bothered me.) What bothered me about this fine conference, was it seemed to me that the attitude behind it and reflected in many of the presentations was the same attitude that one sees in those who search for (magical) technological fixes except now the magic was to come from SBE scientists. (An improvement*

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over the craving for technological fixes since the problems are mainly human, but still magical thinking.) What I mean by this is that rather than seeking technological products the speakers were asked to produce knowledge products, but still products packaged as if they were Answers (with a capital A) to questions that people like General Flynn might have. (To be sure, many speakers did not quite cooperate.) What was missing was the sense that SBE scientists don't and are unlikely to have any pre-packaged solutions that will work in different communities, in different seasons of the year, with different people and intelligent adversaries. What they do have to offer is a way to think systematically about certain problems, ways to gather information and interpret it, including ways to open what is found to competing interpretations, methods for estimating the generalizability and reliability of information, and the like. David Laitin, in an outstanding summary, alluded briefly to the missing element: studies of how the government itself is doing. I thought it telling that the only session devoted to methods was devoted to models; which come as close to being a technology-like product as anything the SBE sciences have to offer. In my view the methods most likely to be most relevant, if the army culture could be changed to adopt them, are efforts to vary "treatments" where we don't know which are best, to gather information about the consequences of both intended and unintended interventions, and to learn from the information gathered. For example, war inevitably means that innocent civilians are killed. How should the army react when this happens. Anthropologists might be able to provide some good information, but while they might be able to tell us what is culturally acceptable/traditional they are unlikely to know how the meaning of such actions will change if recompense is offered by an Americans army. But the army can try several different ways of making up for innocent details it causes: it can compensate affected families in different amounts; it might make recompense to a village rather than or in addition to a family, or rather than pay a lump sum settlement it might give regular payments, or it could hold a feast at which apology was given by the person who did the killing or by a superior, etc. Also metrics can be captured on the army's relationship to villages before and after incidents that have been differently recompensed - for example, how forthcoming villagers are about Taliban activities in their area, how receptive locals are to eradicating poppies, how many are willing to join the Afghan army etc. At this remove I cannot design the study (and I would not be the person to do it even if in the field) but there are SBE scientists who can design both proactive systematic research aimed at informing further action and retrospective analyses of the consequences of different treatments/interventions. There will be lots of noise in any such research including unclear results and outright misinterpretations of what is and is not likely to work. This is unavoidable given the conditions in the field and the likely complexity of whatever situational responses are being evaluated, but despite this the knowledge gained may place the U.S. in a far better position to plan for how best to proceed than it now occupies. (The new wiki for the boots most directly on the ground gives an idea of the potential when information is assembled and shared; when it is more rigorously assembled, with key variations identified and consequences more reliably measured, the gain could be far greater - indeed the army might well learn from inviting an SBE science team to study, organize and review in the light of social science knowledge what is now shared on the Wiki.)

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The armed forces can be justly proud of their record as learning organizations (When your people are killed when you don't learn, there is a huge incentive) but learning about the current war is never as quickly accomplished or as easily taught as learning about the last one. With the help of the SBE sciences our armed forces can learn more, more quickly, about the war they are now in and what paths are most likely (no guarantees) to lead to success. To do so it would help if they turned to the SBE sciences not for (or not just for) neatly packaged knowledge products (e.g. what does anthropology tell us about how to show respect to a village leader) but also for what these sciences have to offer about ways to learn and to test the reliability of what things one is learning. Rick

- 40.2. As I sat through some very interesting sessions, I kept thinking that they may be a group of experts that were missing. DoD does not have to start from scratch. DoS, NATO, the UN, the Peace Corp, the International Red Cross, etc. have developed and improved cultural competency programs for decades. I have reviewed those from the UN, Sweden, the Peace Corp, and parts of DoS and they are excellent. Also, what was learned was applied and modified based on what worked and what didn't work. The academic work was interesting, but actual field work like that from David Kennedy was much more impressive and relevant.
- 40.3. Kudos to the organizers for focusing on key questions with regard to socio-cultural knowledge and then aligning very impressive and relevant panel members. Regarding socioculturally informed situational awareness for the military operator, which is my focus, we heard about the importance of location and how to acquire local knowledge in denied environments. We were reminded of tested methodologies for conducting systematic analyses that seek to understand meaning in people's behavior. We were cautioned about the constraints in representing and interpreting the complex sociocultural world via models. All of this is essential knowledge for planning and executing interventions that seek social change. Still needed is to do what the international aid community has done, as brought up in comment 2, - that is, go beyond doctrine which has identified problem areas in which socio-cultural knowledge has a role and prepare analysts to be competent in the analysis process and operators in the application of analysis to operations. We need to develop, communicate, and educate a social science for the military that incorporates a way of knowing and best practices in applications. Those of us who are DoD social scientists could translate this body of knowledge and practice that social science has to offer regarding knowing the population, conducting social interventions, and understanding complex effects of interventions. And, in concert with our academic and contractor partners, we could apply, package, and disseminate this knowledge and practice through products and education and training. At present, there are many disconnected pieces that could be better aligned to focus on integration of social science knowledge and practice in support of the military mission. I believe that we know enough to plot the way forward. The need is certainly very great. Lucy Whalley