



Control of Sensitive Information in a National Security Context

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
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Management of Sensitive Information





- We are all familiar with control of sensitive information
 - In our personal lives
 - In our workplaces
- Control regimes vary—from “common sense” to legal controls
- Effective management of information is highly dependent on individual action
 - Knowledge of rules and policy
 - Accurate understanding and appreciation of risk
- Management of sensitive national security information relies on the same principles

Classified Information

- Information can be classified under Statute or Executive Order
 - The Atomic Energy Act governs Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data
 - EO 13526 governs National Security Information
- Levels of Classification are "risk based"
 - Confidential: "undue damage to national security"
 - Secret: "serious damage"
 - Top secret: "exceptionally grave damage"
- Management policies are tied to classification category and level


Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)



“All unclassified information for which, pursuant to statute, regulation, or agency policy, there is a compelling requirement for safeguarding and/or dissemination controls”

- Subject to EO 13556
- Over one hundred categories are in use across government
- Attempts to regularize categories, policy, access restrictions are ongoing, but having limited success
- Control is much less formal, in most cases
- Management relies on policy, training and adherence to “need to know”

Determination of Information Sensitivity



- Original Classifiers—a few government officials
- Derivative classifiers—many trained individuals
 - Decisions are based on Classification Guides
- Guides are drafted by committees.
 - Some are very information specific
 - Others are broader and “risk informed”
- Approaches for designation CUI are more heterogeneous and less formal
 - CUI frequently governs the “type” of information rather than specific information

Review of documents is a critical procedure to ensure proper classification: to ensure neither underclassification nor overclassification occur.

Control

Sensitive Security Information



This is a Cover Sheet

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This information must be protected from unauthorized distribution and must not be left where someone without a need-to-know may have access to it.

For demonstration purposes only, no CUI information revealed

- Policies governing proper identification and control are in place
 - Review at stages
- Sensitive information should be clearly marked
- Sensitive information is stored, handled, and transmitted in specified ways
- Access is limited to authorized individuals with need to know (NTK)
 - Can include clearances, job function, other criteria
- Procedures exist to identify mistakes or accidents
 - Mitigate consequences
 - Inform process improvements

Need to Know (NTK)

The NTK principle is extremely important in managing access to both classified and CUI

- Credentials (clearances or other qualifications) can make a person eligible to access certain information, but such credentials do not establish a right to access information
- NTK management can be very formal
 - With training, formal briefing into (and out of) NTK groups
- In other cases, NTK determination is based on the assessment of individuals who hold information
 - Strong cultural reinforcement enables individuals to deny access to information for which they have no NTK

Environment and Culture



- **Training is critical**

- At Sandia, training begins (for everyone) upon employment and continues at regular intervals (at least annually)
- Failure to complete training can (and does) result in automatic loss of access to the workplace

- **Awareness**

- Postings, placards, signage throughout the workplace reinforce awareness of sensitive information, risks associated with mishandling it, and individual responsibility
- Information about adversary attempts to access sensitive information (across government) is regularly shared (as appropriate)
- Briefings to provide insights into threats to sensitive information can heighten awareness of risk

- **Derivative classifiers, management, and information control specialists answer questions and provide both guidance and support**

Risk Assessment



- R&D in biology offer enormous benefits to public health and economic prosperity
 - These benefits are widely understood and discussed
- Such work also carries credible risks
 - Risks arise from possible adversary action
 - and from potential accidents
 - While potential risks are discussed, detailed information about them is typically not so available
- In a national security environment, risk information is more widely available
 - Such information is very important in risk/benefit analyses

Control of Sensitive Information Relies on Structure and Culture



- Rules, policies and procedures
 - Guidance
 - Risk informed approaches can be important
 - Training
 - Review of projects, information
 - At all stages
 - Support
- Culture
 - Responsibility
 - Awareness
 - Informed understanding of risk
 - To information
 - To public health