Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces (2010)

Owing to the expansion of network-centric operating concepts across the Department of Defense (DOD) and the growing threat to information and cybersecurity from lone actors, groups of like-minded actors, nation-states, and malicious insiders, information assurance is an area of significant and growing importance and concern. Because of the forward positioning of both the Navy's afloat and the Marine Corps expeditionary forces, IA issues for naval forces are exacerbated, and are tightly linked to operational success. Broad-based IA success is viewed by the NRC's Committee on Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces as providing a central underpinning to the DOD's network-centric operational concept and the Department of the Navy's (DON's) FORCEnet operational vision. Accordingly, this report provides a view and analysis of information assurance in the context of naval 'mission assurance.

 

Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) is a military option under consideration by the U.S. Department of Defense. This book, the final report from the National Research Councils Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability, analyzes proposed CPGS systems and evaluates the potential role CPGS could play in U.S. defense.

U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike provides near-, mid-, and long-term recommendations for possible CPGS development, addressing the following questions:

• Does the United States need CPGS capabilities?
• What are the alternative CPGS systems, and how effective are they likely to be if proposed capabilities are achieved?
• What would be the implications of alternative CPGS systems for stability, doctrine, decision making, and operations?
• What nuclear ambiguity concerns arise from CPGS, and how might they be mitigated?
• What arms control issues arise with CPGS systems, and how might they be resolved?
• Should the United States proceed with research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) of the Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) program5 and, ultimately, with CTM production and deployment?
• Should the United States proceed with the development and testing of alternative CPGS systems beyond CTM?