

Robust Summary Statistics for Strategic and Social Processes in Networks

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
Substantive questions

- Who are the most **influential** agents/groups?
 - In **coordination**
 - In **communication**/gossip
- Is a network good at coordinating?
 - Will its agents achieve a **high payoff**?
 - Will they be able to converge to equilibrium strategies **quickly**?
- How to **intervene** in/**disrupt** the network?

- Examples:
 - Adopting technologies, e.g. cryptography.



- Practical relevance:
 - **Cohesive** networks behave more like units
 - **Segregated** networks converge slowly



- Limited budget, must target **some** nodes.


Advances to date

- Who are the most **influential** agents/groups?
 - In **coordination**
 - In **communication/gossip**
- Is a network good at coordinating?
 - Will its agents achieve a **high payoff**?
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- Answer:
 - Network **centrality**.



- Answers:
 - **Homophily**/segregation measures
 - **Cohesion**.




- Attack/defense games.

Practical complications

- Network **responds** to intervention
 - Agents **adjust** strategies.
 - Need **game-theoretic** modeling.
- Network **imperfectly** observed
 - **Random** noise.
 - Strategic **activation** of relationships.
- Observing network is **costly**.




- Example:
 - Melissa Dell (2015): drug trafficking responds to enforcement effort



- Examples:
 - Players strategic about when to activate their relationships (Chandrasekhar, G, and Yang 2017)
- Full survey either expensive or impossible.

Simple, physics-inspired models

- Simple laws of motion
 - Capture key “forces”
 - Use intuitions from forces, energies
 - **Not** combinatorial/algorithmic
- Focus on useful decompositions
- Find ways to easily *measure* the key dimensions



- Networks without networks¹
- Be smart about censoring

¹ Breza, Chandrasekhar, McCormick, Pan (2017)

Takeaways/a recipe

- Game theory + “physics/engineering”
 - Cook up models with reasonable decision-making and nice laws of motion/decompositions.
- Now add some statistics
 - Make sure the above items are robust to sampling;
 - We know how to estimate them when there is systematic bias in the links we measure
- Extensible
 - “Multiscale, multiplex, multimodal,” etc.
 - Better chance of this if math is simple and linear.
 - Recent encouraging finding: game theory with incomplete information is secretly quite similar to game theory with network structure – a hope of incorporating incomplete information.