


Privately Releasing Statistics

NAS CNSTAT Privacy Workshop
Panel on Current Capabilities of Differential Privacy

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Differential Privacy - Recap

For every pair of
Neighboring Tables



For every
output




Should not be able to distinguish whether O
was generated by D_1 or D_2

$$\left| \log \left(\frac{\Pr[A(D_1) = O]}{\Pr[A(D_2) = O]} \right) \right| < \epsilon \quad (\epsilon > 0)$$

Adding or removing a
row from the input table
should not significantly
impact the output of the
algorithm.

Differential Privacy - Recap

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
Should not be able to distinguish whether O
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$$\log \left(\frac{\Pr[A(D_1) = O]}{\Pr[A(D_2) = O]} \right) < \epsilon \quad (\epsilon > 0)$$

- Neighboring tables differ in one row.
- Consider all pairs of tables, and not just the actual input to the algorithm
- May depend on what must be kept secret
 - Privacy of persons
 - Privacy of households
 - Privacy of businesses

Differential Privacy - Recap

For every pair of
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For every
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
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$$\log \left(\frac{\Pr[A(D_1) = O]}{\Pr[A(D_2) = O]} \right) < \epsilon \quad (\epsilon > 0)$$

- Privacy bound must hold for all possible outputs
 - A worst case guarantee
- Outputs can be any type
 - Statistics
 - Contingency tables
 - Microdata
 - Regression parameters
 - ML models

Differential Privacy - Recap

For every pair of
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


- **Plausible Deniability:**
Attacker can't tell whether input was D_1 (with individual) or D_2 (without individual)
- **Privacy Loss Parameter:**
Larger epsilon is lesser privacy
- **Privacy Loss Budget:**
Releasing multiple outputs results in additive increase in privacy loss.

Achieving differential privacy

- Techniques known for releasing outputs of several data analyses
- **Statistics and tabular summaries**
- Synthetic microdata
- Parameters of regression and statistical tests
- Machine learning models

Releasing a count: Laplace Mechanism


Add noise to each count to hide the contributions of one individual



From single counts to tabular summaries

Release several contingency tables ... at different levels of geography

- Total population
- ... by Age
- ... by Sex
- ... by Age x Sex
- ... by Race
- ... by Age x Race
- ...



Key idea 1: Composition

- *Sequential Composition:*
Privacy loss is additive across multiple releases ...
- *Parallel Composition:*
... unless they are run on disjoint subsets of data (e.g. across states)
- **Algorithm:** Use Laplace mechanism with parameter ϵ :
 - For each marginal (total, by age, by sex, ...)
 - And for each geography (national, state, county, ...)

Total privacy loss: $\# \text{ tables} * \# \text{geo levels} * \epsilon$


Challenge

- **Algorithm:** Use Laplace mechanism with parameter epsilon:
 - For each marginal (total, by age, by sex, ...)
 - And for each geography (national, state, county, ...)
- **Problem:** Consistency
 - Released statistics do not add up
 - E.g.: State counts do not add up to national counts

Key idea 2: Postprocessing & Inference

- *Postprocessing theorem:*
Postprocessing the output of a DP mechanism does not degrade privacy

- Idea: Inference




Challenge

- **Algorithm:** Use Laplace mechanism with parameter epsilon:
 - For each marginal (total, by age, by sex, ...)
 - And for each geography (national, state, county, ...)

Total privacy loss: $\# \text{ tables} * \# \text{geo levels} * \epsilon$

- **Problem:** Privacy loss adds up
 - Either get all the results accurately but with poor overall privacy loss
 - Or get a bounded privacy loss, but all the statistics have high error

Key idea 3: Carefully select what to add noise to.



Key idea 3:

Carefully select what to add noise to.

- Total population
- ... by Age
- ... by Sex
- ... by Age x Sex
- ... by Race
- ... by Age x Race

Select and Measure these tables

Reconstruct these tables using
inference

Select-Measure-Reconstruct




- [Hardt-Talwar 2010] • We know tight lower bounds on the error of a set of linear queries under a fixed budget
- We know efficient methods to automatically choose the right strategy
 - [Hardt-Talwar 2010] – K-norm Mechanism
 - [Li et al 2010] – Matrix Mechanism
 - [McKenna et al 2018] – **HDMM**: High Dimensional Matrix Mechanism

In ongoing experiments with US Census Bureau products (2020 Decennial, Business Dynamics Statistics), HDMM reduced error by factors of 3x – 48x compared to baseline algorithms.


More DP algorithm design ideas

- [Hardt et al 2012] • Iteratively construct a “synthetic database” by measuring the query with most error
- [Mironov 2017] • Clever proof techniques to lower privacy loss
- [Zhang et al 2014] • Reduce the dimensionality of the data or statistics released
- [Li et al 2014] • Data dependent noise addition
- [Kotsoginannis et al 2019] • Truncating the data (Lipshitz extensions) for queries with higher sensitivity (e.g., queries with joins, counts)

Sophisticated algorithms lower error at same level of privacy



Open source DP tools for practitioners



<https://www.dpcomp.org//>

Ektelo

Ektelo is a novel programming framework and system for implementing both existing and new privacy algorithms.

[View the Project on GitHub](https://github.com/ektelo/ektelo)

<https://github.com/ektelo/ektelo>



<https://ektelo.github.io/>

References

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