

Identifying the Factors That Make Violent Organizations More Likely To Behave the Way They Do

Victor Asal

vasal@albany.edu

Presenting work completed with

R. Karl Rethemeyer, Brian Phillips, Corina Simonelli , Gary Ackerman Richard Legault, Ora Szekely,
Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Joseph Young

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<https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/database>



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Notes before we begin

- If you are interested in the material...feel free to shoot me an email or give me a call
 - Talking about other analyses we have done
 - If data is available we can do analyses of specific interest
 - If data is not available we can talk about how we might get that data for analyses of specific interest




Collecting Data

- The value of comparing at the organizational level
 - The ability to identify factors that make certain behaviors more likely or less likely
 - The ability to distinguish between organizational and contextual factors – and the factors that can be impacted
- Data
 - Ethnic Minority Middle East Organizational Behavior 1980-2004 Yearly violent & nonviolent
 - Big Allied and Dangerous 1 Terrorist 1998-2005
 - BAAD 2 Insurgent 1998-2012 yearly soon to be 2015 & include all terrorist orgs (2014 for all)




Meta-Theoretical Model



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Annual MAROB Data- example of what can be done with data on violent and nonviolent organizations



Episodic, not continuous violence

PFLP West Bank		PFLP Lebanon	
1984-88	Violence only	1980-81	Violence only
1989-90	Mixed	1982-83	No contention
1991	Violence only	1984	Violence only
1992-93	Mixed	1985	No contention
1994	Violence only	1986	Violence only
1995	Mixed	1987	No contention
1996	Violence only	1989-91	Violence only
1997-2000	Nonviolent contention	1992	Mixed
2001-2003	Mixed	1993-1996	Violence only
2004	Violence only	1997-1999	No contention
		2000-01	Nonviolent contention
		2002	Violence only
		2003-04	No contention

Violence or nonviolence – MAROB

Variable	Non Contentious	Nonviolent	Mix	Violence
Democracy	-12.7%	11.7%	10.5%	NS
Domestic	13%	-7.2%	-3.3%	NS
Diaspora	37.8%	10.6%	10%	17.3%
Gender Inclusion	1.1%	19.5%	-1.3%	19.3%
Religious	-6%	NS	2.7%	NS
Leftist	-8.8%	NS	NS	11.1%
S. Repression	-21.8%	-9.5%	2.9%	28.4%
S Services	-14.8%	NS	3.6%	15.4%



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
WHEN DO INSURGENCIES PURSUE OR USE CBRN?



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extreme problem of likelihood and consequences




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The Future: More CBRN?

If costs associated with adopting new technology are lowered...

No. of casualties
per \$1 cost*



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Why use CBRN?

- Opportunity vs. ideology
- Most of the literature focuses on Religious ideology – but not tested empirically



Insurgent organizations attacking, threatening, plotting with CBRN 1998-2012

Al-Qasa Martyrs Brigade	Al-Qa'ida	Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula
Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb	Ansar Al-Islam	Armed Islamic Group
Communist Party of India-Maoist*	Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement	Hamas*
Hizballah	Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham*	Kurdistan Workers' Party
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam*	Mujahedin-e Khalq	National Liberation Army of Colombia
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola	Oromo Liberation Front*	Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Popular Liberation Army*	Real Irish Republican Army	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia*
Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting	Taliban*	

*** Designates organizations that used CBRN weapons in one or more attacks.**



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The organizations that are most likely to pursue a CBRN device are:

- **Lethal - lethal organizations are the most likely to pursue and use CBRN capabilities.**
- Allied – highly connected organizations engage in more CBRN development activity and more attacks.
- Based in wealthy countries – organizations in more developed countries are more likely to seek a CBRN capability (but this does not affect actual use of a weapon).
- **No other factors have more than a 3 percentage point impact. Ideologies are either not significant or have extremely small effects – less than 1 percentage point (though positive).**



An examination of Networks and Behaviors in
the Middle East and North Africa

WHAT MAKES INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS MORE LETHAL KILLING CIVILIANS AND MORE CONNECTED



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
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Modeling

- Stochastic Actor-oriented Model (SAOM) of network and behavior change
 - Behavior and network composition/change modeled simultaneously
- Data
 - Middle East and North Africa
 - 1998-2012
- DVs:
 - Alliance connections
 - 15 yearly 72 x 72 matrices
 - Fatalities from terrorist attacks by insurgents



Using stochastic modeling to identify feedback loop



Results

Predictors of alliance ties

- Shared ethnonational or religious ideology
- Shared home base country
- Territorial control
- Terrorist fatalities

• Predictors of behavior

- Most orgs do not kill much, but once they do, they kill at an accelerating pace
- Territorial control & operating in a democracy more killing
- No alliances less killing

Loners tend to stay loners and do not kill much...
but if loners make friends, they start to kill & kill more and more



New or enhanced work with BAAD2

- Impact of COIN and CT policies
- Attacking US and US targets
- Criminal behavior
- Proxy analysis of potential Nuclear attack
- Mass casualty attack




Appendix



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ISIS 2014



Legend

- ↔ = Support (collaboration/ideological support/verbal praise)
- ↔ = Target (fighting/enemies)
- > = Negative relationship that was previously positive

Source: Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) Data



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