Organizational Options for Redirecting DPRK Nuclear Experts

Anne M. Harrington and Ambassador Joseph DeThomas

Executive Summary

If progress continues in the Six Party Talks, it is almost certain that the DPRK will raise the issue of what to do with the workforce that has supported the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Experience has shown that organizing a science redirection effort in a country giving up WMD capabilities is a valuable, but time-consuming and complex task. Steps should be taken in the near term – and with the other non-DPRK participants in the Six Party Talks – to explore options for both organizational structure of such an effort, as well as an initial set of project activities.

This paper addresses the organizational issue. Section I, Introduction, lays out how such an effort can reinforce the denuclearization goals. It also cautions that redirection is a long term process for which success metrics are often difficult to establish, that early attention should be paid to short-term, achievable goals, and that it is crucial to avoid overpromising what the program can deliver. Section II, Key Considerations and Lessons Learned, identifies six major program elements on which decisions will have to be made at an early stage. This section can be viewed as a diagnostic tool that governments wishing to embark on a redirection program must use before planning a program. Section III, Where to Start, provides several possible organizational models, each of which has advantages and disadvantages. Section IV, Suggested Path Forward, includes a number of steps that can be taken now and highlights the urgency of beginning a diplomatic and programmatic planning process.

The paper also includes two annexes: Annex 1 is the G8 Global Partnership: Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects. This is included as a useful checklist based on international consensus, but that strongly reflects U.S. government requirements. Annex 2 is a Comparative Table of Structure/Responsibilities, which is offered as a tool for considering various organizational options.

I. Introduction

If agreement among the Six Parties is reached on establishing a redirection effort for the DPRK’s nuclear experts, it is essential have a good idea of what kind of structure and organizational model will be used for the program well in
advance. Experience has shown that redirection programs can be valuable tools for contributing to a variety of objectives (including as an incentive), for building trust and confidence in both directions, and for providing valuable insights into how the technical community functions. In the case of North Korea, they can contribute to dismantlement, increase the transparency of the DPRK’s programs, create incentives for DPRK compliance and reduce the incentives to export nuclear expertise. On the other hand, excessive expectations by either side can pose dangers. For North Korea, the program will not magically employ all of its nuclear community overnight – from weapons designers to farmers at Yongbyon; for the rest of the Six Parties, it will not provide total transparency, irreversibility, or a permanent guarantee that North Korea will never misuse its science again for weapons development. Thus, the design phase of a redirection effort will need to manage expectations as a key task.

As useful as the best practices and lessons learned from earlier redirections may be, they are not a prescription for a North Korean redirection program. That program will need to be fashioned for a very unique environment which has more than a decade of negotiating experience and past practices behind it and will have aspects that are new, responding to the different policy context into which the redirection structure must fit.

The complexity of designing and implementing a redirection goes far beyond the scope of this paper. There are, however, some major themes that deserve to be highlighted and will be explored in more detail below:

- **Redirection is a long term process**, not a quick in-and-out program. Because it is long term in nature, the most sustainable approach is to design a multilateral program from the beginning, starting with consultations and consensus among the Six Parties.
- **Trust and transparency** are major hallmarks of redirection efforts, but are hard to quantify. Because of the DPRK’s track record, there will be pressure from multiple directions to develop success metrics. Do not underestimate the difficulty of this.
- On average, it takes one to two years to get a redirection program up and running. The more complex the environment, the more difficulties there are to resolve. This argues in favor of implementing achievable short term activities that can be integrated into the disablement and decommissioning efforts while a longer term program is designed and put in place.
- Do not succumb to the temptation or political expediency of allowing expectations and ambitions overtake realities. This is a proven recipe for failure. Some of the most enduring problems in previous redirection programs stem from promising more than could be delivered.

II. Before Starting - Some Key Considerations and Lessons Learned

Although the DPRK presents unique challenges that will have a unique solution, any redirection effort needs to start by drawing from lessons learned and best practices that have broad validity. The key questions explored below involve policy objectives, the time allotted to the effort, the number and
type of participants in redirection, the program framework and timeline, scope (the number of sites and entities engaged) of the program and scale of the program (how ambitious the goals are for the effort), and program design.

1. **Policy Objectives:**

The parties need to know what risks they are trying to mitigate and what policy objectives they are trying to achieve as they design a program.

- The risk is quite different from that we faced at the collapse of the Soviet Union both in nature and scale.
- Each redirection program has a different mix of policy objectives. For example, our efforts in Libya and Iraq, while comparable in size are quite different in objectives and tactics.

- All participants in a redirection program must as a first order of business achieve clarity on what the participants’ needs and expectations from a redirection program are. These will not overlap perfectly, but there must be an understanding of those needs or any program will collapse in incoherence. As the number of participants increases, the importance and complexity of this task grows. For the U.S., the purposes of a redirection program are likely to be in priority order:
  1. to prevent the DPRK from recouping its investment in nuclear capabilities by exporting its now-surplus capacity to other countries or terrorist groups,
  2. to gain long-term transparency on the North Korean nuclear program.
  3. to provide beneficial alternatives to the DPRK for dismantling its weapons related capabilities, and
  4. to shore up the broader normalization process and prevent DPRK grievances about the loss of its investment from undermining the Six Party Process and

For the North Koreans, the principal needs they might want addressed include:

1. to extract the maximum tangible economic benefit from its denuclearization steps:
2. to preserve dearly won technological capabilities;
3. to provide meaningful and profitable employment to an elite group of technicians and scientists; and
4. to reap scientific and commercial rewards from redirection.

Other members of the Six Parties or other potential funders might have a mix of needs and motives.

2. **Time:**

The parties need to have clear expectations about the time available and needed for the effort. Redirection is a long-term process, not just a series of projects. Establishing trust and transparency, building human and physical capacity, and generating measurable, mutually beneficial results take years. On the other hand, the U.S., the DPRK, and others of the Six Parties – for different reasons – may approach this matter with a sense of urgency.
• This sense of urgency can lead to *ad hoc*, poorly designed arrangements that could prove an expensive and dangerous trap.

• Establishing a consensus on a clear time-scale for the effort will help clarify questions of scope, scale, and structure for the parties.

3. Participation:

The Six Parties (initially minus the DPRK) should add redirection to their agenda immediately to determine who will participate in redirection and what roles they are prepared to play. The consultations are a matter of some urgency as it will take much longer to reach consensus among the five parties on objectives and general approaches than it will for the DPRK.

• The U.S. and DPRK “build it and the others will come” option will be extremely tempting. It may appear far simpler for the two principal parties in dismantlement to proceed with redirection under the same banner. Past experiences indicate that key implementers—notably the U.S. DOE national laboratories—will not wish to see their particular projects delayed or subsumed in a greater whole. The Department of State, faced with pressures to deliver program, may also need to show progress immediately. Pressure to pursue a bilateral program based on existing work of the national laboratories, perhaps supplemented by a small Department of State science engagement effort, will be a natural outgrowth of such pressures. If past experience in the Korea context is any guide, such U.S. bilateral programs (e.g., U.S. work with KEDO) tend to run into legislative and funding issues. At that point, the USG has tended to reach out to other donors after all the structural decisions are made, with frustrating and less-than-satisfactory results for all concerned.

  o *The temptation to move quickly and alone should be avoided except as a short-term (e.g., one year) expedient:* This does not preclude initial bilateral U.S. engagement efforts that spin-off from disablement and denuclearization while consultations unfold. But, proceeding with a bilateral program without quickly opening consultations for a broader, better funded structure for the long haul will leave the U.S. holding the bag on a program it may not sustain and that may well not meet many key DPRK expectations.

• Depending on the views of the other parties, consultations with non-Six Party Talk participants (e.g. EU, Canada, and Australia) might also begin now, or at minimum room should be left at the table for their future participation, particularly if future financial, technical, or other support is expected from them.

• An important related matter is to determine what sort of entities will implement a redirection program.
  o This will affect the cost of the program and the flexibility and speed with which it can be implemented.
  o Whether to allow NGO’s, the private sector, industry associations, universities, or other organizations into the implementation effort, at what time, and under what circumstances will be important questions.
• There are experienced program implementers in the private sector that have been important partners in other redirection efforts. Their experiences and expertise should be incorporated into early stages of program development. Some of them tend to be more nimble and lower cost providers of services than their U.S. government counterparts and far quicker than the assistance programs of other governments.
  
  o The national laboratories, DOS and DOE are already present in the DPRK effort. How to integrate their current activities into a broader, multilateral redirection program should be considered in the first phase of discussions.
  
  • If diplomacy permits, the involvement of the two international science centers -- ISTC in Moscow and STCU in Kyiv – should be investigated now. They are the most experienced with this kind of activity and already have specific experience that could help more a DPRK forward. All but China and the DPRK among the Six Parties have ISTC experience.
    
  • ISTC and STCU hosted an ROK delegation in the fall of 2007, whose purpose was to view the centers and understand better how redirection functions. The ROK officials were able to visit a project in which a South Korean company is the partner.

4. Logical Framework and Implementation Timeline:

A defined initial scope and timeline (logical framework/logframe) with a clear mutual understanding of objectives and priorities is a critical first step. Throughout the course of implementation, the logframe should be reviewed periodically and adjusted as necessary.

• This will force the parties to address the DPRK’s impatience to reap tangible benefits, the rather significant logistical barriers to a redirection program and the difficulties that will result from involving a variety of funders and implementers.

• Addressing logistical issues (e.g., taxes, visas, customs, procurement, financial transfer mechanisms, transport and lodging) will help avoid the “surprise” delays that many new redirection program face.
  
  o The situation is changing with respect to legal limitations on activity with the DPRK. With the suspension of the Trading with the Enemy Act, potential removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and Congressional action to ease certain restrictions, there may be more flexibility in terms of sources of funds and the ability of both government and non-government programs to operate in the DPRK. This broader ability to engage will be very important as the redirection effort moves forward.
5. Scope and Scale

Along the same lines, it is essential to recognize the limits of redirection and not fall into the trap of thinking that the program can do more than it can. For example, the DPRK may look to redirection to support broad economic development goals. But, this poses severe risks in terms of scale and scope of effort. Redirection cannot solve the DPRK’s economic problems.

- Redirection programs cost millions of dollars. Economic development and transformation programs are measured in the tens of billions of dollars. Do not confuse redirection with economic transformation. This was the undoing of several worthy programs attempted in Russia.
  - In particular, one must be careful about promising commercial job creation as a direct outgrowth of modest science redirection programs. If commercialization is included in an effort, it is essential that partners with clear commercial interests in the DPRK such as the ROK and PRC take the financial lead in that area.

- To the extent that early activities can be incorporated into disablement, dismantlement, or decommissioning agreements, they should be. Doing something modest now, will reduce pressure while a structure is built to sustain a longer term effort.

- It will be important to develop a clear sense of scope for redirection. Two key questions that need to be answered are:
  1. Should the program be limited to weapon scientists?
  2. Which institutes and facilities should be involved in a redirection program?
     - Past experiences counsel against an inflexible limit on dealing with non-weapon scientists. Redirection should involve a combination of weapons and academic scientists with the goal of bringing the weapons scientists and engineers back into the open scientific community. Trying to limit the program to only those with weapons involvement is an unreasonable program restriction in that many projects may require skills and expertise outside the nuclear weapons community.
     - With regard to institutional scope, there will be a temptation to deal only with what we know – Yongbyon. But, the DPRK’s program extended beyond Yongbyon. And, it may well be that a broader scope will be necessary and wise. IAEA past activities provide a potential list of institutes that may be useful to team with Yongbyon in projects. Previous IAEA technical cooperation programs have involved a number of facilities to which redirection activities might be extended under the right circumstances:
       - Institute of Radiation Protection
       - Institute of Experimental Biology
       - Institute of Radiation of Medicine, Academy of Medical Sciences
       - Academy of Marine Radioactivity
6. *Program Design:*

- Redirection program development should involve the North Koreans from the outset. It is important for the redirection activities to respond to DPRK priorities and to create internal political support for redirection in the DPRK. The DPRK’s almost monomaniacal desire for “concrete benefits” has to be dealt with in this phase. A DPRK scientist advisory group may be advisable, perhaps following the model that was used for the Iraq redirection program. That said, we can expect initial suggestions from the DPRK to be both unrealistic and top-down in nature.

- Finding an organizing concept that is attractive to the North Koreans may be important. A program goal that provides both tangible and symbolic benefits that the DPRK leadership can understand might do a great deal to move things along. For example, taking a serious look at whether Yongbyon could be converted into a scientific center of some kind or whether there is a logical research arrangement can be made from the IRT, cyclotron, and possibly higher education institutions.

- In terms of program design, all parties will want to avoid activities that are weapon related. Beyond the self-evident security justification for this, focusing on activities of scientific/economic benefit to North Korea that will not create incentives for security conscious elements of both sides to freeze activities for security review would be wise.

- As with all redirection programs, there will be pressure to demonstrate the program’s effectiveness. Metrics of success are both important to consider early in program design and a bane to program development. Redirection is a process, not a product, and finding hard metrics is extremely difficult. Again, it is important to be realistic and not over-promise what redirection can deliver.

- Thought should be given at the outset to the future. What is the program’s criterion for success and graduation? Should structures be created that will be sustainable once the main diplomatic and nonproliferation task is completed?

III. *Where to Start*

*Structure:*

- It is not too soon to create a structure for the longer haul. Activities specific to redirection should be governed by an unambiguous intergovernmental agreement that includes the key points identified by the G8 Global Partnership. These points are consistent with general U.S. nonproliferation program requirements and have the added benefit of being ‘international’ rather than ‘bilateral.’ Drawing on these principles could also encourage others of the G8 to consider future participation. (See Annex I for the G8 Global Partnership Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects.) To the extent that these points can be covered by using text from existing agreements (bilateral or multilateral) with the DPRK, this may make it easier to obtain their agreement to this set of provisions.
• The Six Parties need to agree on how, under what structure, and when to phase out *ad hoc* U.S. efforts and to move into a multilateral structure. They also need to decide whether activities will be governed by a formal structure, like the secretariats and governing bodies of the international science centers, or through more informal divisions of labor and coordinating bodies.
  - Whatever they decide, they *must* develop a mechanism to prevent North Korean divide and conquer tactics.

*Possible Structural Approaches: Integrated, Stand Alone, Branch of Existing Program*

**-- Overview**
The scientist redirection program in the former Soviet Union operates out of two stand alone international science centers (see below for further information), each of which has its own Governing Board, Secretariat, and staff. Because the U.S. was the leading force in the organization of both science centers, the organizational approaches and even the founding agreements and operating documents are very similar. The task of redirecting Soviet WMD scientists paralleled other U.S. cooperative threat reduction programs in the region in terms of requirements for facility access, program reporting, financial audits, privileges and immunities for international staff, and liability protection. In Iraq and Libya, different models were developed. In Iraq, the redirection program centers around the Iraqi Interim Center for Science and Industry, whose Scientific Advisory Group has existed since the beginning of the program and is a central element of the program and of decision making. In Libya, there is no physical center or facility, but rather a coordination of technical assistance efforts led by the State Department.

Redirection activities are not yet a specified activity under the DPRK denuclearization agreement, if redirection becomes linked specifically to the agreement, a logical organizational construct would be to incorporate it into whatever structure is established for implementation. If redirection is not linked specifically to the agreement, there are a number of other options.

**Option 1 – Integrated: Build on the Six Party Working Groups:** New program discussions with North Korea are likely best housed at least initially within familiar channels. The Six Party Agreement establishes working groups around each part of the agreement. Among these existing structures is a nuclear working group. In their current configuration, the working groups can meet independent of plenary meetings to work on agreement details, as well as to oversee implementation.

If the proposed approach to embed near-term redirection activities in the disablement and dismantlement processes is accepted, the nuclear working group would probably be adequate to deal with this group of activities, providing they include at least some redirection expertise from State and
DOE. One could imagine a relatively decentralized process with each donor operating a bilateral assistance effort on some portion of the redirection effort. The working group could function as a donors’ coordination body and perhaps as a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for a longer term program. One could also imagine using the group to negotiate common logistical procedures (e.g., customs clearance, visas, etc.) This would be a relatively easy approach establish. But, it would be exposed to divide and conquer tactics and we could expect very uneven performance among donors. Maintaining policy coherence would be a challenge.

Assigning the program task completely to U.S. (or other) redirection experts is unrealistic unless they work directly with those who are responsible for negotiating the larger agreement of which the redirection program will be one of many elements.

One could consider more structured mechanisms flowing out of the working group process. The working groups could craft an agreement that would lead to a more permanent structure like that described in the following option. In this regard, when thinking of program models, it is useful to identify what models are already known to the Six Parties. In the DPRK case, the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is an example of a model familiar to the Six Parties, but in which other countries could participate as well. The KEDO structure was useful in that it allowed the North Koreans to have the United States at least appear to be in charge even if South Korea was providing most of the money and technology for the reactors (Japan provided some additional funding). Another important feature of KEDO was its provision for nuclear liability protection. It also had the potential to provide a real multilateral framework for other countries.

The KEDO model may or may not be a good choice, but since it exists, the North Koreans and others may anticipate a similar implementation structure for programs related to the current negotiations. The main features of KEDO are summarized in Annex 2. It might be useful to use the KEDO format as a way of comparing differing options.

One option is to think of a new model for a DPRK redirection program in which one umbrella organization would house different divisions that would cover all elements of the denuclearization agreement implementation, for example, disablement and dismantlement activities, the provision of incentives to the DPRK, and perhaps a verification group. This would provide an integrated structure and one into which countries could contribute staff and expertise, depending on their capabilities and experience. It would also provide unified oversight, which will be particularly important if there are linkages and milestones that affect activities across the various areas of the agreement.

---

3 These include programs such as radiation health physics, environmental assessment and remediation, and use of DPRK experts for dismantling and decommissioning.
The secondment of staff, if that is a route that is pursued, needs to be considered carefully. Within the staff, there should be North Koreans as well. However, if each participating country continues to pay for its own staff, this creates some tension within the staff on two levels: first, the paycheck comes from home, so instead of being attached to the implementing organization, there is more attachment to the home government. This may seem on the surface to be an advantage, but there are obvious drawbacks to having a staff, each member of which serves two masters. The second level of tension comes from differences in pay for staff performing similar duties. This basically cannot be helped unless a UN-type pay scale is institute, which can be very costly.

Option Two – Stand Alone Organization. The strengths of a stand alone operation are institutionalization, legal and financial infrastructure to permit smooth operations, funding stability, and some insulation from bilateral political tensions. The principal weakness is the diplomatic effort and time it takes to form such a structure, as well as the bureaucratic process that comes with such a formal structure. Another potential weakness of the stand alone program design (such as the science centers) is that when it operates in the same sphere as other cooperative threat reduction activities, it is not likely to link to them in the most effective ways unless that is part of the original design concept. This is a lesson we learned from the Soviet Union experience that has been applied to a limited extent in Iraq and Libya. For example, it took a number of years to link efforts in developing technology for Russian nuclear material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) programs to research and development projects in the science centers. There are a number of other technical nonproliferation areas to which science center projects have made a direct and significant contribution over time, but much opportunity was lost.

A stand alone organization could also work, but would have to have very close links to other efforts to ensure that milestones are being met and that redirection is moving forward in pace with other requirements.

As with the KEDO example, it takes a significant amount of time to get a program off the ground. Both of the science centers took about two years to get from concept to first grants. This may be too long in the North Korean case, which argues again for finding ways to integrate early programs into ongoing activities. If a stand alone option is pursued, the countries involved should be encouraged to form a preparatory committee (PrepCom) and to agree on terms of reference for the PrepCom that enable it to take all the necessary actions needed to advance start up as quickly as possible. In the case of the ISTC, the PrepCom was authorized to develop the organizations statute, financial and other operating documents, develop a system for soliciting and reviewing proposals, and so forth. By the time of the first Governing Board meeting, all the key documents had been vetted by the parties, a substantial group of proposals had been reviewed and were ready.
for funding, and the organization became fully operational as soon as the board met.  

**Option Three – Branch Operation.** A third option would be to take steps to amend the international agreement governing one or the other of the existing science centers and to open a branch operation in North Korea using the basic organization framework, proposal review and funding mechanisms, and other programs and services that have developed over the years. One advantage is that the U.S., Russia, South Korea, and Japan are all familiar with this mode of operation and China could be drawn in as a contributing country. Another advantage is that both centers have well established procedures for soliciting and reviewing proposals, awarding grants, monitoring implementation, and so forth. In addition, there have been a number of South Korean staff members over the years at the ISTC who could bring their expertise to a new effort. It is also timely since many ISTC members are seeking to adapt the institution to a very different environment in Russia. Disadvantages include the challenge of modifying an international agreement and well-established bureaucracies that may lack the flexibility to adapt to a very challenging new environment. Moreover, the ISTC is currently troubled by a variety of diplomatic and internal tensions.

**IV. Suggested Path Forward**

In the end, the most realistic approach is likely to contain elements of all three options.

- In the very near term, working through existing working structures will probably provide the most immediate pathway to establishing a program. In the beginning, these activities wouldn’t even be called redirection; they would be directly linked to disablement and dismantlement, but would bridge into a redirection program.
  - Examples: environmental survey/analysis and remediation plan for Yongbyon; radiation health physics program
- The parties need to stop and reflect **now** on the elements for consideration provided at the beginning of this paper even for a transitional *ad hoc* effort through existing structures.
- The parties need to begin to consult now on what they want to do for the long haul. This would best be done through the existing nuclear working group, supplemented by redirection experts for the U.S. and other parties.
- Parties should begin now to broaden the base of participation in redirection. This might include other countries, as well as the science centers, NGO’s, industry, academia, and other partners.
- The North Koreans need to be brought into the discussion **before** all decisions are made; for a redirection program to be sustainable, it has to respond to priorities of the partner country.

---

4 It is worth noting that the ISTC could have begin operations six months earlier if it had not been for a late EU decision to insist on authentic agreement texts in all EU languages, rather than in Russian and English as originally agreed.
• Once decisions have been made on the six key issues in section II above, the optimal shape of the program should emerge. However, assumptions should be revisited on a regular basis and the program adjusted to meet evolving conditions.

• Expect that there will be criticism of the program, but be ready to defend your decisions. Redirection is not a reward mechanism; it is the only (overt) tool we have for addressing with what is arguably the most difficult aspect of controlling weapons mass destruction: intellectual capital.
The G8 Global Partnership: Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects

The G8 will work in partnership, bilaterally and multilaterally, to develop, coordinate, implement and finance, according to their respective means, new or expanded cooperation projects to address (i) non-proliferation, (ii) disarmament, (iii) counter-terrorism and (iv) nuclear safety (including environmental) issues, with a view to enhancing strategic stability, consonant with our international security objectives and in support of the multilateral non-proliferation regimes. Each country has primary responsibility for implementing its non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety obligations and requirements and commits its full cooperation within the Partnership.

Cooperation projects under this initiative will be decided and implemented, taking into account international obligations and domestic laws of participating partners, within appropriate bilateral and multilateral legal frameworks that should, as necessary, include the following elements:

- Mutually agreed effective monitoring, auditing and transparency measures and procedures will be required in order to ensure that cooperative activities meet agreed objectives (including irreversibility as necessary), to confirm work performance, to account for the funds expended and to provide for adequate access for donor representatives to work sites;
- The projects will be implemented in an environmentally sound manner and will maintain the highest appropriate level of safety;
- Clearly defined milestones will be developed for each project, including the option of suspending or terminating a project if the milestones are not met;
- The material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful purposes and, unless otherwise agreed, will be used only for the purposes of implementing the projects and will not be transferred. Adequate measures of physical protection will also be applied to prevent theft or sabotage;
- All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that the support provided will be considered free technical assistance and will be exempt from taxes, duties, levies and other charges;
- Procurement of goods and services will be conducted in accordance with open international practices to the extent possible, consistent with national security requirements;
- All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that adequate liability protections from claims related to the cooperation will be provided for donor countries and their personnel and contractors;
- Appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor representatives working on cooperation projects; and
- Measures will be put in place to ensure effective protection of sensitive information and intellectual property.”

http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2002kananaskis/arms.html
## Comparative Table of Structure/Responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>KEDO</th>
<th>Option 1</th>
<th>Option 2, etc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Board</td>
<td>US, ROK, Japan and later Europe - met on average every two or three months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisions</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Based in New York and run by U.S. w/50-60 staff from other countries seconded from their home governments and continued to answer primarily to their home governments rather than the organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Office</td>
<td>Established small office of about 3 staff at the reactor site work with KEDO's DPRK counterpart, the General Bureau of Light Water Reactors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start-up time</td>
<td>Approx. 2 years – time was needed to set up the organization, negotiate a supply contract for the nuclear reactors and a variety of protocols such as on transportation, privileges and immunities, communications and other issues. Some work was started in North Korea by about 1996, by initially conducting surveys of the reactor site. By 1997, ground had been broken at the site. By 2002 when the project began to come apart, the support infrastructure had been completed (a port, road housing facilities etc) and work had started on the reactors.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Responsibilities</td>
<td>- make sure the North received heavy fuel oil (HFO) shipments</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- work with the Korean Electric Power Company, the main contractor on the reactors, to build the reactors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o provided all the workers, equipment, arranged for subcontractors, financing, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>