

EVALUATING INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS: AN ECONOMIC REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE

Government-University-Industry Research Roundtable (GUIRR)
Infrastructure: The Cost of Doing Nothing

June 25, 2013, The National Academies, Washington, DC


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beecher@msu.edu • ipu.msu.edu

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


MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

- IPU-MSU has served the regulatory policy community since 1965
 - ▶ Mission: To support informed, effective, and efficient regulation of the electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, and water industries
 - ▶ Support from the regulatory policy community
 - ▶ Professional education for more than 20,000 regulators
- Neutral and integrative educational programs and research
 - ▶ A principled approach to regulatory practice
 - ▶ An empirical approach to regulatory analysis
 - ▶ A reasoned approach to structural and regulatory change
- We teach the “ideal” of regulation *in the public interest*
 - ▶ Regulation as a “balancing act” between utility investors and ratepayers





Public utilities as “invisible networks”



Public utilities in the U.S. economy: 2% of GDP

- Most utilities are dominated by private ownership – water is the exception
- Revenues (2007 Census)
 - ▶ Electricity generation: \$440 bil.
 - ▶ Electricity distribution: \$306 bil.
 - ▶ Wired telecom: \$294 bil.
 - ▶ Wireless telecom: \$168 bil.
 - ▶ Gas distribution: \$132 bil.
 - ▶ Water: \$9 bil.
 - ▶ Electricity transmission: \$4 bil.




Public institutions:

Collective interests; limited discretion; human rights; access; positive externalities


		Feasibility of cost allocation [exclusivity; divisibility; priceability]	
		Lower	Higher
Marginal impact of production or consumption [rivalry; depreciability; exhaustibility]	Lower	Public goods or collective, merit, or worthy goods	Toll goods, club goods, infrastructure, utilities, and network services
	Higher	Common-property or common-pool goods or resources	Private goods for individual consumption

Market institutions:
Individual interests; consumer discretion; property rights; congestion; negative externalities


- 66 nuclear, 580 coal, 1,169 petroleum, and 1,705 natural and other gas plants
- 1,432 hydroelectric and 39 pumped storage facilities
- 1,356 renewable energy facilities (non-hydro)
- 395,000 miles of high-voltage (>100 kV) transmission lines
- 15,700 transmission substations
- 6.0 million miles of electricity distribution lines
- 20,000 miles of gas gathering pipelines
- 306,000 miles of interstate and intrastate transmission pipelines.
- 1,400 gas compressor stations
- 400 underground natural gas storage facilities
- 2.0 million miles of gas distribution mains
- 75,000 water treatment facilities
- 2.0 million miles of water distribution mains (half are 6 to 10 inches in diameter)
- 14,500 wastewater treatment facilities
- 600,000 miles of wastewater collection lines
- 18.7 million equivalent telephone poles
- 1.7 billion miles of metallic wire
- 38 million miles of fiber wire




Technical traits of utilities: comparing capital intensity



Estimated 5-year funding needs (\$bil., ASCE)



CPI trends for utilities (U.S.)





Utilities expenditures by income level and regressivity

Consumer expenditures on utilities by income quintile (all consumers \$2010)



Consumer expenditures on utilities by income quintile (all consumers 2010%)





National Civic Federation (1907):

“Public utilities are so constituted that it is impossible for them to be regulated by competition... None of us is in favor of leaving them to their own will, and the question is whether it is better to regulate or to operate.”

Commissions as agencies of the state

Quasi-legislative:
Trustee

Quasi-administrative
Expert

Quasi-judicial:
Judge*

Commissions make policy like a legislature; rulemaking and standards development; controversial as to authority, discretion, and policy activism

Commissions apply expertise like a bureaucratic agency; implementation and enforcement; controversial as to effectiveness and efficiency

Commissions deliberate and make decisions like a specialized court; procedural due process, impartiality, judicial demeanor; controversial as to conflicts of interest

	Structural status	Unregulated	Regulated
Electricity	Partial restructuring and wholesale competition with mixed results; some retail choice	Independent power generation; most nonprivate utilities	Interstate and unbundled transmission (federal); retail distribution (state); vertically integrated (shared)
Natural gas	Vertical segregation with competitive wholesale markets; some retail choice	Wellhead (commodity) gas production; most nonprivate utilities	Interstate transmission (federal); intrastate transmission and retail distribution (state); pipeline safety (shared)
Telecom	Oligopolistic with workable competition; regulation is limited in scope	Long-distance, wireless, internet, and cable services; other services and equipment	Small independent providers (state); network access and universal service (shared)
Water	Generally integrated and monopolistic; some wholesale and contract activity	Most nonprivate utilities; most privatization contracts; most wastewater providers	All privately owned utilities and some nonprivate utilities (state only)

Economic regulation serves the public interest

*Premised on
Market failure*

*Manifested in the
Regulatory compact*

*Stewarded by
Independent regulators*



The regulatory institution substitutes for competition

Principles

Processes

Policies



Regulation's functional model motivates desired performance

Standards

Accountability

Incentives


Rights: The utility enjoys

- An exclusive franchise for a certificated service territory, protection from competition and antitrust, an opportunity to recover prudently incurred costs including a reasonable return on investment, rights of eminent domain, and the ability to charge customers for the cost of service

Obligations: The utility accepts

- An obligation to provide all paying customers with safe, adequate, reliable, and nondiscriminatory service on just and reasonable terms, while assuming certain business risks and subjecting itself to regulatory oversight of prudence, prices, profits, and performance

Regulators must establish a “fair-return price”



$$RR = r(RB) + O\&M + D + T$$

Prudent?
Used and useful?
Just and reasonable?
Compensatory?

where:

RR = annualized revenue requirements
r = authorized (not guaranteed) rate of return to compensate debt holders and equity shareholders
RB = ratebase (original cost of utility plant in service net of accumulated depreciation and adjustments)
O&M = operation & maintenance expense
D = depreciation expense
T = taxes

Revenue requirements (RR)

Billing determinants (usage) = Cost-based rates

- Economic regulation is justified by the *public interest*
- Regulation ensures that service is *safe, adequate, reliable, and accessible*
- Utility investments and expenditures must be *prudent*
- Utility investments and expenditures must be *used and useful* to ratepayers
- Returns must be *compensatory but not excessive*
- Rates charged by utilities must be *just and reasonable*
- Regulated returns are authorized but *not guaranteed*
- Regulated utilities are not shielded from *business risks*

**Tested through a long history of Supreme Court decisions*

- Privatization is not competition - market power must be addressed
 - ▶ Private utilities are strongly motivated to invest – compare to publicly owned
 - ▶ Regulators do not (micro)manage utilities – substituting for competition, they must provide incentives for efficiency and innovation
- All regulation is incentive regulation (A. Kahn) – to shape performance
 - ▶ Utilities will respond to the incentives and disincentives provided
- Three essential incentive tools impose discipline or “regulatory risk”
 - Regulatory lag – passive
 - Prudence review – reactive
 - Incentive returns – active (and should be used sparingly)



Regulatory lag:
cost control

Prudence review:
efficiency

Incentive
returns:
innovation

Democratic institutions: Legislative and Executive

Public policies that set broad social goals

Economic
development

Managing the
commons

Distributive
justice

Economic regulation to ensure prudence

Efficiency

Safety

Adequacy


Reliability

Access


Does infrastructure modernization demand new paradigms?

SMART GRID

A vision for the future — a network of integrated microgrids that can monitor and heal itself.




Broadband




UTILITY SCALE		Structural		
		Larger scale	Smaller scale	Individual (nonutility)
Technological	Larger scale	Super-grid utilities with lumpy capacities	Networked providers	
	Smaller scale	Distributed production	Micro-grid utilities with flexible capacities	
	Granular scale			END USER

- Disruptive technologies challenge assumptions about scale and optimization
 - ▶ Distributed production, energy storage, micro-grids, fuel cells, etc.
 - ▶ Potential benefits of smaller scale: reliability, security, resilience, environmental protection, technical innovation
 - ▶ Climate change suggests technical and policy urgency
 - ▶ Sector-specific considerations: energy is not telecom, water is not energy, etc.
- Key technical and structural questions
 - ▶ Can service be provided without *network infrastructure*?
 - ▶ Can service be provided without *public utilities*?
- Key policy question
 - ▶ Do persistent market failures (monopoly or other) call for continued economic regulation?





- Do not build *tomorrow's* infrastructure according to *yesterday's* demand and supply specifications
 - ▶ Limitations of static surveys of needs - revisiting the assumptions (in-kind replacement, expansion, etc.)
 - ▶ Infrastructure as dynamic and complex systems (supply and demand)
 - ▶ Opportunities for optimization and strategic asset management
- Infrastructure spending gap as a *construct*
 - ▶ Close from the top (demand-side and supply-side efficiency)
 - ▶ Close from the bottom (cost-based pricing)
- Toward a new paradigm
 - ▶ From growth to sustainability





New normals in water usage



- In the U.S., public supply accounts for only one third of withdrawals for either irrigation or thermoelectric cooling
- Water withdrawals are relatively flat and household water usage has declined
 - ▶ Multiple causes (standards, price, culture)
 - ▶ Increasing pressure prices
 - ▶ Especially problematic for “shrinking cities”
- Opportunities for reoptimization
 - ▶ Preemptive replacement v. “run to fail”



Genetic algorithm optimization (water)



Slow growth in energy sales




- Rather than a *new paradigm*, regulation can advance a *new prudence*
 - ▶ Prudence remains core to the regulatory paradigm, despite changing conditions
 - ▶ Efficient achievement of obligatory goals in the absence of competition
- Policy tools for ensuring prudence
 - ▶ Performance standards and measurement
 - ▶ Monitoring, audits, and compliance reviews
 - ▶ Incentives (positive and negative)
- Modern prudence can be refined to include *robust standards* to promote
 - ▶ Capital optimization, operational efficiency, and productivity
 - ▶ Load management and capacity utilization
 - ▶ System reliability, public safety, and service quality
 - ▶ Cost, information, and risk management systems
 - ▶ Flexible, adaptive, and resilient infrastructure design



- The value of comparative and cross-national research
- Researchers at NextGen Infrastructures (TU Delft, Netherlands) are working with providers to develop performance indicators (FRAME)
 - ▶ Flexibility, Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Economic (FRAME)
- Flexible design deals directly with the issues of technological and structural scale and uncertainty
- For utility infrastructure, flexibility could be the key to
 - ▶ Prudence from the regulator's perspective
 - ▶ Risk management from the utility's perspective
 - ▶ Sustainability from society's perspective



NEXT
GENERATION
INFRASTRUCTURES



- Complexity theory
- Game theory
- Genetic algorithm optimization
- Total cost analysis
- Flexible design
- Emerging technologies
- Supply chains
- Construction management
- Coordination
- Interdependency
- Financial models
- Standards development
- Behavioral economics
- Evaluation methods
- Information systems
- Knowledge transfer
- Infrastructure governance
- Transdisciplinary education



The Institute of Public Utilities supports informed, effective, and efficient regulation of the electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, and water industries.

We fulfill our mission by providing to the regulatory policy community integrative and interdisciplinary educational programs and applied research on the institutions, theory, and practice of modern utility regulation.

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INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Owen Graduate Hall
735 E. Shaw Lane, Room W157
East Lansing, MI 48825-1109
517.355.1876 • 517.355.1854 fax
ipu.msu.edu • ipu@msu.edu

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Declining Water Sales and Utility Revenues

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Our flagship event, the Annual Regulatory Studies Program, known as "Camp NARUC," is grounded in sound regulatory theory and accepted practices and incorporates a reasoned approach to contemporary structural and regulatory change. Open only to the public and nonprofit sectors. Join us for one week or two - and "Come Back to Camp" for continuing education! [More Information](#) | [Register](#) | [Fax-In Form](#)



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National Conference of Regulatory Attorneys

June 16-19, 2013 | San Francisco, CA

An exciting conference that includes a number of topics that have not been discussed previously including FERC Order 1000, the Internet Protocol transition in telecommunications, water recycling and contamination and important presentation on gas safety and future gas supplies