

Assessing Security for FDA Approval:

*Panel I - Infrastructure Challenges for the Medical Device Industry
Innovation Policy Forum*

Medical Devices Innovation: Opportunities, Threats and Challenges


The National Academies
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September is National Preparedness Month

*“Failing to prepare
means preparing to fail”*

Whole of Community Approach



Three Core Concepts

- Awareness
- Preparedness
- Collaboration

Roadmap for Today's Discussion


- Understanding the Current Landscape
- Our CDRH/FDA Medical Device Cybersecurity Program
- Our Vision Ahead



Scope of Public Health Impact

- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates of annual patient encounters
 - 35 million hospital discharges
 - 100 million hospital outpatient visits
 - 900 million physician office visits
 - Billions of prescriptions
- Most of these encounters likely include a networked medical device

Medical Device Cybersecurity Background




MEDICAL DEVICES

- Contain configurable embedded computer systems
- Increasingly interconnected
- Wirelessly connected
- Legacy devices

USE ENVIRONMENT


- Varied responsibilities for purchase, installation and maintenance of medical devices, often silo-ed
- Variable control over what is placed on the network
- Inconsistent training and education on security risks

Medical Device Vulnerabilities



- Network-connected medical devices infected or disabled by malware
- Malware on hospital computers, smartphones/tablets, and other wireless mobile devices used to access patient data, monitoring systems, and implanted patient devices
- Uncontrolled distribution of passwords
- Failure to provide timely security software updates and patches
- Security vulnerabilities in off-the-shelf software designed to prevent unauthorized device or network access

Incidents & Researcher-Demonstrated Exploits



- VA Cath Lab temporary closure (1/10) due to malware infecting computers used during interventional cardiac procedures
- “Hacking” of implantable insulin pump (Radcliffe, 8/11)
- Security researchers present CDRH with cyber vulnerabilities of medical devices (Rios & McCorkle, 4/13)


CDRH/FDA Activities

- **Guidance**
 - Premarket (Draft, 2013)
 - Wireless Technology (2013)
 - CS for Networked Devices with OTS Software (2005)
- **Standards**
 - Cybersecurity (2013)
 - Interoperability (2013)
- **Public Communication**
 - Safety Communication to Stakeholders (2013)
 - CS for networked medical devices shared responsibility (2009)
- **Organization**
 - Established CSWG of Subject Matter Experts (2013)
 - Stood up Cyber Incident Response Team under EMCM (2013)

CDRH/FDA Collaborations

- New partnership with **Department of Homeland Security**
 - Coordinating incident response with ICS-CERT
 - Participating in EO13636-PPD21 Integrated Task Force WGs
 - DHS-led Cyber-Physical Functional Exercise (Cracked Domain) planners and players
- Enhanced communication & partnering with **HHS**
 - HHS/Critical Infrastructure Protection
 - Cyber Threat Analysis Center (CTAC)
- Strengthen collaboration with **NIST** through standards and CSF Working Group
- Engaging proactively with diverse stakeholders
 - Outreach/education of hospital, healthcare & medical device community
- New collaboration with **NH-ISAC**

CDRH/FDA Ongoing Activities



Aligning with EO13636 & the Cybersecurity Framework for the HPH Sector

**EO 13636 – PPD 21
ONGOING WG
PARTICIPATION**



**TRANSLATE NIST CSF
TO MEDICAL DEVICE
AND HPH SECTOR**

**INTERNAL PROCESS IMPROVEMENT
OUTREACH WITH STAKEHOLDERS**

