



biosecu.re

www.biosecu.re | piers@biosecu.re | [@biosec_re](https://twitter.com/biosec_re)

Piers Millett, Principal

Gaps in international regulation of DURC



Recommendations

There is a need to:

- A. Increase no. & diversity of states interested
- B. Revisit rationale behind DURC
- C. Explore desirability of dealing with DURC
- D. Hold more in depth technical discussions
- E. House DURC issues in a larger process



Recommendations

A. Increase no. & diversity of states interested

The screenshot shows the UNOG website for the Meeting of Experts held from July 16 to 20, 2012. The page features a banner of the Palais des Nations in Geneva. The main content area includes a photograph of the conference hall, a text summary of the meeting, and a detailed programme for Tuesday, July 17, 2012. The programme includes sessions on recent developments in education and awareness raising on biosafety and biosecurity, and on dual-use research of concern.

Meeting of Experts (16-20 July 2012)

The 2012 Meeting of Experts was held in the Palais des Nations from 16 to 20 July 2012. The meeting opened at 10:00 on Monday 16 July and closed at 12.00 on Friday 20 July. The meeting was held in Room XVIII.

The Meeting of Experts was chaired by Ambassador Boujemâa Delmi of Algeria. In accordance with the decision of the Seventh Review Conference,

Tuesday 17 July

09.00 - 10.00 Recent Developments in Education and Awareness Raising on Biosafety and Biosecurity - *Ukraine & University of Bradford*, Room XXIV

- [Detailed programme](#)

13.00 - 15.00 Dual Use Research of Concern: The H5N1 Controversy and its Implications for Science Governance - *Netherlands & United States*, Room XXIV

- Kerr - [The H5N1 Influenza Controversy: Implications for Science Governance](#)
- Donker - [Dual-use Research of Concern and Biosecurity in the Netherlands](#)



Recommendations

A. Increase no. & diversity of states interested

Some countries and institutions have developed oversight mechanisms to manage DURC-related risks. Many, however, have not done so, owing to competing demands on resources and capacity, limited awareness of the issue, or a perception that it is not relevant to their particular context or priorities.

WHO, 2013



Recommendations

A. Increase no. & diversity of states interested

We firmly believe that the potential dual-use nature of emerging technologies in itself should not be used as a pretext for proscribing or restricting their availability to developing countries for permitted purposes.

Pakistan, Dec. 2016



A. Increase no. & diversity of states interested





Recommendations

B. Revisit rationale behind DURC

A Portuguese expert suggested that DURC was more readily translated into concrete governance frameworks than broader efforts to consider DUR, as it was easier to define relevant research.

Swiss experts thought it was particularly useful for engaging with, and raising awareness amongst, the scientific community.

One expert from Germany did not think that DURC was a useful concept



Recommendations

C. Explore desirability of dealing with DURC

I think there could be problems related with the 'awareness dilemma' when you make people think about dual use when they don't think about it, you multiply the risk of misuse

Portuguese expert



Recommendations

C. Explore desirability of dealing with DURC

Communication and continuing dialogue across a broad range of sectors and stakeholders are essential to create a culture of responsibility, cooperation and trust. In particular, improving mutual understanding of the various approaches to risk identification and assessment among stakeholders will be critical to establishing that dialogue

WHO, 2013



C. Explore desirability of dealing with DURC

...international discussions can hopefully provide guiding principles with flexibility to inform and assist national implementation

UK Experts



D. Hold more in depth technical discussions

1. What subset of DUR might received greater oversight through DURC governance?
2. Could the DURC concept be usefully applied in other settings?
3. How can existing governance measures be adapted to address DURC?



biosecu.re

www.biosecu.re | piers@biosecu.re | @biosec_re



Recommendations

E. House DURC issues in a larger process



Oie



IFBA



Recommendations

E. House DURC issues in a larger process


Global Health Security Agenda

“...We must come together to prevent, and detect and fight every kind of biological danger – whether it's a pandemic like H1N1, a terrorist threat, or a treatable disease.”

President Barack Obama, 2011



Global Health
Security Agenda



biosecu.re

www.biosecu.re | piers@biosecu.re | [@biosec_re](https://twitter.com/biosec_re)

There is a need to:

- A. Increase no. & diversity of states interested
- B. Revisit rationale behind DURC
- C. Explore desirability of dealing with DURC
- D. Hold more in depth technical discussions
- E. House DURC issues in a larger process