DHS Cybersecurity

Election Infrastructure as Critical Infrastructure

April 4, 2017
Department of Homeland Security

Safeguard the American People, Our Homeland, and Our Values

- Established in March of 2003 and combined 22 different Federal departments and agencies into a unified, integrated Department

- Homeland security is a widely distributed and diverse national enterprise
  - Collective efforts and shared responsibilities of Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners to maintain critical homeland security capabilities

- 2014 QHSR Homeland Security Missions
  1. Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security
  2. Secure and Manage Our Borders
  3. Enforce and Administer Our Immigration Laws
  4. Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace
  5. Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience
National Protection and Programs Directorate

Enhance the Resilience of the Nation's Infrastructure

- Our mission is to protect cyber and critical infrastructure
  - Terrorism and other physical threats
  - Growing cyber threats

- Our work provides a holistic risk management approach for the 16 critical infrastructure sectors with unique legal authorities supporting true private public collaboration

- We build cyber and physical risk management capacity of Federal partners, private sector owners and operators, state and local agencies, and others
Our Cybersecurity Responsibilities

What we do

- Protect Federal Civilian Executive Branch networks from malicious cyber actors

- Support the private sector and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments in the management of their cyber risk

- Provide technical assistance in the event of a cyber incident, as requested
Interest in Elections

Letting Election Officials Know What is Available to Them

- As the capabilities that enable elections are becoming increasingly dependent on information and communications technology, election officials are assuming greater responsibility for the cybersecurity of these systems.

- DHS has built trusted relationships with state and local IT officials to strengthen the security of their networks and is providing outreach to election officials to ensure that they are aware of the no-cost cybersecurity services that are available to them.

- DHS services are available only upon request, and are voluntary; they do not entail regulation or binding directives of any kind.
Cybersecurity of 2016 Election Infrastructure

**Known Incidents**
- Public reporting of incidents on two state systems
- Cyber Incidents identified on politically affiliated systems

**Investigation**
- Cyber Threat Indicators derived from investigations

**Information Sharing**
- USG shares cyber threat indicators and States review network traffic; 20+ states find additional probing and attempted intrusions

**Analysis/Attribution**
- Some cyber threat indicators point to nation-state actors
- Threat actors appear to be targeting online VRDBs and election websites

**Security Services**
- DHS provides incident response, best practices, and vulnerability management services, by request, to election officials, media, and private sector vendors

**Cyber Hygiene**
- By request, DHS helped State and local governments identify and mitigate thousands of vulnerabilities to internet facing systems in advance of Election Day

**Coordination**
- A critical infrastructure sector was established to improve the quality and timeliness of information provided to the election sector and provide priority for cybersecurity services

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Homeland Security
## Summary of Services

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<td>Identifying and Limiting Vulnerabilities</td>
<td>Cyber Hygiene Scanning</td>
<td>Automated, recurring scans of internet facing systems that provide the perspective of the vulnerabilities and configuration errors that a potential adversary could see</td>
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| | Risk and Vulnerability Assessment | • Penetration testing  
• Social engineering  
• Wireless access discovery  
• Database scanning  
• Operating system scanning |
| Assessing Threats and Sharing Information | NCCIC Tips and Alerts | Provides alerts, analysis reports, bulletins, best practices, cyber threat indicators, guidance, points-of-contact, security tips, and technical documents to stakeholders |
| | MS-ISAC Security Tips | | |
| Applying security expertise and best practices | Cyber Security Advisors & Protective Security Advisors | Regionally located personnel who engage state and local governments, election crime coordinators, and vendors to offer immediate and sustained assistance, coordination, and outreach to prepare and protect from cyber and physical threats. |
| Incident Response | NCCIC | 24x7 cybersecurity operations centers that maintained close coordination among the private sector, government officials, the intelligence community, and law enforcement to provide situational awareness and incident response, as appropriate. |
| | MS-ISAC | | |
Designation of Critical Infrastructure Sectors

- Energy
- Dams
- Chemical
- Critical Manufacturing
- Communication Sector
- Government Facilities
- Defense Industrial Base
- Food & Agriculture
- Health & Public Health
- Information Technology
- Commercial Facilities
- Emergency Services
- Nuclear Reactors, Materials & Waste
- Transportation Systems
- Water & Wastewater
- Financial Services
Election Infrastructure as Critical Infrastructure

How did we get here?

- Definition of Critical Infrastructure: “Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”

- State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments are existing participants in critical infrastructure mechanisms

- On January 6, 2017, Secretary Jeh Johnson established election infrastructure as a critical infrastructure sub-sector of the existing government facilities sector. This announcement meant that:
  - DHS had determined that systems and assets included in election infrastructure meet this definition of critical infrastructure; and
  - DHS would establish a voluntary mechanism for coordinating with the members of this critical infrastructure community

- The objective of establishing this sub-sector is to provide State and Local election officials and private sector election community with timely and tailored threat information and cybersecurity services
Election Infrastructure

Election infrastructure represents the assets, systems, and networks most critical to the security and resilience of the election process, which includes:

- **Storage facilities**, which may be located on public or private property that may be used to store election and voting system infrastructure before Election Day
- **Polling places** (including early voting locations), which may be physically located on public or private property, and may face physical and cyber threats to their normal operations on Election Day
- **Centralized vote tabulation locations**, which are used by some State and localities to process absentee and Election Day voting materials
- IT infrastructure and systems used to maintain voter registration databases
- **Voting systems** and associated infrastructure, which are generally held in storage but are located at polling places during early voting and on Election Day
- **Information technology infrastructure and systems used to manage elections**, which may include systems that count, audit, and display election results on election night on behalf of state governments, as well as for postelection reporting used to certify and validate results
Benefits of Designation

Reduce System Vulnerabilities

In addition to the services already discussed…

- Designation as a sub-sector establishes mechanisms to rapidly share information across the community to identify and mitigate system vulnerabilities

- Coordinating councils will be established, focused on the physical and cyber security and resilience of the election infrastructure
  - Coordinating councils are used to share information on vulnerabilities and threats and to enable collaboration across Federal, state, and local governments, as well as with private sector partners, to determine ways to mitigate risks
  - Participation in the council is voluntary
  - Coordinating Councils are used widely by the private sector critical infrastructure community (Energy SCC, FS-SCC, IT-SCC, etc)
Benefits of Designation

Reduce System Vulnerabilities (continued)

- Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) protections
  - Allows sector coordinating councils to include private vendors and experts from information technology firms to actively participate in sensitive security conversations and planning alongside their government partners
  - This would provide election officials with greater access to a broad range of technical and security expertise

- Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII)
  - Operators of critical infrastructure can voluntarily share information with DHS via PCII to exempt that information’s dissemination in Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, use in civil litigation, and regulatory use
  - States, vendors, or individuals that identify vulnerabilities in election infrastructure can share this information, to the benefit of all who leverage these systems, without fear that it will be used against them
  - Provides an effective mechanism for election officials to share vulnerability information and ensure that mitigations can be applied by all
Benefits of Designation

Understand Threats to Election Infrastructure

In addition to the services already discussed…

- Designation as a subsector allows DHS to provide security clearances to election officials, as appropriate.

- Election officials could be briefed on relevant classified intelligence and leverage that to secure their systems in a manner more informed of the threats they face.
Benefits of Designation

Respond to Incidents and Malicious Cyber Actors

In addition to the services already discussed…

- Designation as a sub-sector allows owners and operators of election infrastructure to benefit from the U.S. government’s strategic and policy-based efforts to protect critical infrastructure
  - Promotion of international norms that prohibit peacetime cyber attacks against critical infrastructure
  - Use of Executive Orders to respond to attacks on critical infrastructure
Executive Order 13964

Respond to Incidents and Malicious Cyber Actors

- As a sub-sector of critical infrastructure, the Secretary of Treasury is able to sanction persons responsible for cyber enabled activities that harm or compromise a computer that supports an entity in a critical infrastructure sector
  - This would cover malicious cyber attacks that, for example, deleted data, impaired the function of a system, or destroyed a system

- On 29 December 2016, EO 13694 was amended to enable the Secretary of Treasury to also sanction persons responsible for cyber enabled activities that tamper with, alter, or cause a misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining election processes or institutions
  - These protections may serve to deter future malicious cyber behaviors or allow the U.S. government to hold cyber actors accountable for their actions.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Homeland Security

Geoffrey.Hale@hq.dhs.gov