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Kurt Campbell et al, Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union. (Center for Science and International Affairs: Harvard University, November 1991.)
Ashton Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1992).
Graham Allison, et al, Editors. Cooperative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds. CSIA Studies in International Security No. 2, Harvard Project on Cooperative Denuclearization (Center for Science and International Affairs: Harvard University, January 1993).
Hans Binnendijk and Mary Locke. The Diplomatic Record, 1991-1992. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993)
Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities. (Baltimore, MD: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Distributed by the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
John Shields, “Reports : CIS Nonproliferation Developments,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 3, No. 1. (Monterey, California: Center for Nonproliferation Studies Fall 1995). Available as of February 2009, at: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/31toc.htm
Graham Allison, et al. Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
John Shields, and William C. Potter, editors. Dismantling the Cold War : U.S. and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Forward by Sam Nunn. (Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 1997)
Ashton Carter and William J. Perry. Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).
James Clay Moltz, et al, “Special Report: Assessing U.S. Nonproliferation Assistance to the NIS,” The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 7, Number 1, (Monterey, California: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Spring 2000). Available as of January 2009, at: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/71toc.htm
Joint Working Group, Re-Shaping US-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 2002). Available as of February 2009, at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ReshapingThreatReduction.pdf
Vladimir Orlov, Roland Timerbaev, and Anton Kholpkov, Nuclear Nonproliferation in U.S.-Russian Relations: Challenges and Opportunities (Moscow, Russia: PIR Center Library Series, 2002.)
Robert Einhorn, and Michèle Flournoy, Project Directors, Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2003)
Establishing the next president’s national security agenda: The role of the White House. 06/30/2008, Gordan Adams for Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
“Given the challenges Washington faces, a failing national security policy is almost guaranteed if it allows current processes and structures to continue unreformed--no matter the new leadership in place." “Neither the Bush administration's NSC nor previous administrations' NSCs have been empowered to think strategically or long-term. As a consequence, the short-term takes precedent; tactics overwhelm strategy; and planning capabilities are thin. The good news: Solutions do exist.”
The Mission of Africom: Data can Drive African Sovereignty, Hamlin Tallent in Washington Technology. 09/08/2008
“The role of combatant commands has evolved over the years and Africom has taken another step forward. It will not design war plans, but instead will enable African countries to work together to ensure their security. As one officer said, “We can consider it a success if we do not have American troops on the ground in Africa for 50 years.”
Lugar says arms control has suffered significant setbacks, 01/30/2008, Press release of Senator Lugar.
“Unfortunately, the nuclear non-proliferation and arms control regimes have suffered significant setbacks in recent years. There is growing concern, both in the United States and abroad, that U.S. non-proliferation and arms control policies lack a unifying consensus on how to pursue U.S. strategic interests. As contradictions in American policy have emerged, confidence in U.S. leadership on non-proliferation and arms control has eroded and U.S. commitment is being questioned in foreign capitals.”
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain, 2/2007, GAO
“GAO recommends that DOE (1) revise the metrics it uses to track progress in securing buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material and (2) develop a management information system to track DOE’s progress in providing Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013.”
Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Needs More Reliable Data to Better Estimate the Cost and Schedule of the Shchuch'ye Facility, 5/2006, GAO
“GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to (1) ensure that the EVM system contains valid and reliable data, (2) set aside a portion of the contractor’s award fee until the EVM system produces reliable data, and (3) require the contractor to perform an integrated baseline review (IBR) after awarding the contract for completing Building 101.”
Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved Its Management and Internal Controls, but Challenges Remain, 6/30/2005
“GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense conduct performance reviews of CTR projects upon their completion. Such reviews would provide a mechanism to document lessons learned and apply them to future project planning and implementation. DOD concurred with our recommendation.”
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration, 1/28/2005, GAO
“GAO recommends (1) that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy develop an integrated plan for all U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs and (2) that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs issue clear guidance for the coordination of border security programs. DOE agreed with the recommendations, while State and the NSC staff did not comment. DOD concurred with the need for better integrated nonproliferation programs, but did not specify whether it agreed with the need for an integrated plan.”
Russian Nuclear Submarines: U.S. Participation in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Program Needs Better Justification, 9/9/2004, GAO
“GAO recommends, among other things, that DOD determine whether AMEC activities should include improving security around Russian nuclear submarine bases and whether DOD’s technology development efforts should be expanded to nuclear submarine dismantlement in Russia’s Pacific region.”
Nonproliferation: Delays in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention Raise Concerns About Proliferation, 3/2004, GAO
“The OPCW recognizes that it must increase the number of inspections conducted at facilities that produce dual-use chemicals. Some of these facilities may pose a proliferation threat. The lack of a credible Russian chemical weapons destruction plan has hindered and may further delay destruction efforts, leaving Russia’s vast chemical weapons arsenal vulnerable to theft or diversion. Russia’s destruction efforts rely heavily on international assistance. State and DOD commented that our report is not balanced because it does not provide more examples of successful CWC implementation, and concern that we included a policy option to condition future U.S. aid on development of a credible Russian chemical weapons destruction plan.”
Weapons of Mass Destruction: DTRA Addresses Broad Range of Threats, But Performance Reporting Can Be Improved, 2/2004, GAO
“GAO recommends that the Director of DTRA improve the agency’s annual performance report by comparing the agency’s actual performance against planned goals and, where appropriate, explain why goals were not met and the agency’s plan to address these unmet goals in the future. DTRA agreed with the GAO recommendation that it improve its annual performance report. DTRA stated that it is refining its performance report methodology to better address the linkage of reported performance to planned goals and future efforts.”
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, 3/24/2003, GAO
“GAO recommends that DOE reevaluate its plans for securing Russia’s nuclear material, and with DOD, develop an integrated plan to ensure coordination of efforts to secure Russia’s nuclear warheads. GAO also recommends that DOD develop criteria to guide efforts to secure biological pathogens and revisit its decision not to secure additional chemical weapons sites. DOD agreed with 3 of our 4 recommendations. DOD did not agree to improve security at additional chemical weapons sites.”
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia, 3/5/2003, GAO
“U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have consistently faced two critical challenges: (1) the Russian government has not always paid its agreed-upon share of program costs and (2) Russian ministries have often denied U.S. officials access to key nuclear and biological sites.”
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning, 5/16/2002, GAO
“We recommend that the Secretary of State take the lead in facilitating the development of a government-wide plan to help other countries develop an integrated approach to combat nuclear smuggling. This report makes several recommendations designed to improve management of U.S.-provided radiation detection equipment and to secure recipient country assurances of exchanging information about smuggling incidents.”
Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of Assistance, but Procedural Limitations Remain, 6/2001, GAO
“Our analysis indicated that because of access restrictions imposed by the Russian government, a limited amount of equipment—less than 5 percent of the total value of assistance provided—is in locations where access by U.S. personnel is not permitted. DOD can enhance the quality of its program oversight function by better targeting and expanding the scope of its formal audit and examination procedure. we recommend that the Secretary of Defense better target audit and examination visits to avoid unnecessary duplication of coverage, but expand the scope of such visits to include assessments of projects on the basis of well-defined criteria.”
Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses New Risks, 4/28/2000, GAO
“The U.S. strategy for addressing bioweapon proliferation threats at the source has been to fund collaborative research activities with the relevant Russian institutes. We found that expanding the program will risk 1) sustaining Russia’s existing biological weapons infrastructure, 2) maintaining or advancing Russian scientists’ skills to develop offensive biological weapons, and 3) the potential misuse of U.S. assistance to fund offensive research.”
Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD's 1997-1998 Reports on Accounting Were Late and Incomplete, 3/2000, GAO
“DOD was 16 months late in submitting its CTR accounting report for 1997 and 10 months late in 1998. The delays were primarily due to DOD’s prolonged review of the draft reports and the relatively low priority that its officials placed on ensuring the reports’ timely submission. Our report recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish (1) mechanisms to ensure that future reports are submitted to Congress by January 31 of each year, (2) quality controls and processes to ensure that future reports contain more complete and accurate information, and (3) clear guidance to other executive branch agencies concerning the type of information that DOD needs and the deadline for submitting such information for future accounting reports.”
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned, 4/13/1999, GAO
“Russian funding shortfalls have substantially increased the Mayak facility’s estimated cost while underscoring the need for substantial additional assistance if the Shchuch’ye project’s broader objectives are to be attained. Russian reluctance to share critical information with the United States may limit Mayak’s national security benefits and has contributed to delays in the Shchuch’ye project. Congress may wish to require DOD to identify specific funding sources for the construction of the four additional chemical weapons destruction facilities or provide further justification for continuing the Shchuch’ye project.”
Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in the Former Soviet Union, 4/1997, GAO
“The Defense Special Weapons Agency and the Defense Enterprise Fund have not established the required evaluation benchmarks necessary for DOD to measure the success of the Fund, and the Fund’s long-range plan for attracting private capital has yet to be finalized.”
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 9/1996, GAO
“The draft 1996 CTR multiyear plan is a significant improvement over its predecessor, but it does not adequately reflect uncertainties associated with some projects and cost estimates and it does not explain significant changes from the 1995 plan. This report recommends that the Secretary of Defense make needed improvements to future CTR multiyear plans and refrain from obligating funds for constructing a pilot chemical weapon destruction facility until DOD prepares a more reliable estimate of how much the facility’s construction will cost the United States. It also suggests that Congress may wish to consider linking DOD’s authority to obligate CTR funds for the nuclear storage facility to progress in concluding an agreement on the facility’s openness to the United States.”
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Materials Controls in Newly Independent States, 3/8/1996, GAO
This report addresses (1) the nature and extent of problems with controlling direct-use nuclear materials in the newly independent states; (2) the status and future prospects of U.S. efforts to help strengthen controls in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus; and (3) the executive branch’s consolidation of U.S. efforts in DOE.
Former Soviet Union: Assessment of U.S. Bilateral Programs, 12/15/1995, GAO
“We recommended that the Secretary of Defense institute a proactive, long-term CTR planning process to help DOD allocate CTR funds among competing demands and to guide preparation of annual budgets. DOD accepted our recommendation. DOD’s report to Congress contained incomplete, outdated, and inaccurate data. DOD agreed with our recommendation that any future reports (1) contain accurate data, (2) integrate sources of data on CTR aid to show how it is being accounted for and is being used, (3) link this data to its overall determination, and (4) provide more information on planned audits and examinations.”
Former Soviet Union: U.S. Bilateral Program Lacks Effective Coordination, 2/1995, GAO
“While the Freedom Support Act gives the State Department Coordinator broad responsibility for U.S. bilateral programs with the FSU—and calls on him to coordinate with other countries and international organizations on aid programs to the FSU—we found that, in practice, the Coordinator’s role is much more limited. The Coordinator has limited or no authority to direct activities of the CTR program or worldwide programs with the FSU components, such as those of the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and Department of Agriculture, and thus has no way of ensuring that all programs for the FSU complement one another.”
Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat Reduction Assistance Can Be Improved, 9/1995, GAO
“DOD made some progress in the CTR program’s first year audit. However, the report does not fully present all of DOD’s audit and examination activities for fiscal year 1995, as required, and does not describe how DOD plans such activities. The report does not describe the condition of the assistance, as required, and contains outdated and inaccurate listings of CTR assistance deliveries. The limited number of projects DOD reviewed raises questions about the basis for DOD’s program-wide determination that CTR assistance has been accounted for and used for its intended purpose. Other sources of information for the projects included random observations by U.S. technical teams, recipient-provided data, and national technical means.”
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union: An Update, 6/17/1995, GAO
“In some areas, the CTR program has made progress over the past year and its long-term prognosis for achieving its objectives may be promising. CTR aid should allow Ukraine to meet It START obligations. On the other hand, difficulties in world with the Russians in resolving key issues, such as the design of a chemical weapon disposal facility, have slowed progress on several projects that could have major long-term significance.“
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union, October 6 1994, GAO
“We recommend that the Secretary of Defense institute a proactive, long-term CTR planning process to help DOD properly allocate the billions of dollars it hopes to spend, including developing estimates of total requirements for achieving CTR objectives, prioritization of competing objectives, evaluations of projects, and assessments of what U.S. aid could reasonably achieve. DOD officials should periodically update the plan and use it in producing annual budgets keyed to achieving priority CTR goals.”
Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S. Dismantlement Assistance, 3/8/1993, GAO
“The U.S. government has not prepared a single prioritized list of all items affecting the destruction of former Soviet nuclear weapons, since Russia has ruled out a direct US. role in dismantling former Soviet nuclear weapons. U.S. officials have instead developed potential projects that do not directly involve nuclear weapons dismantlement and made plans to obligate funds for such projects. Also, US private industry experts have not been involved in developing priorities for dismantling nuclear weapons.”
Soviet Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Efforts to Help Former Soviet Republics Secure and Destroy Weapons, 3/1993, GAO
“Significant gaps remain in our nation's understanding of how best to deal with the FSU’s nuclear weapons. Russia's refusal to permit direct U.S. involvement in its dismantlement process appears to seriously constrain U.S. options for accelerating the rate of dismantlement. Uncertainties remain concerning Russia's storage facility, the ultimate disposition of Russia's plutonium, and other matters. Such uncertainties may be acceptable, given the historic opportunities open to the United States. Congress should nonetheless be aware of them.”
Russian Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Implementation of the 1991 Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, 7/27/1992, GAO
“We believe that a number of important questions should be addressed before the United States commits to building a large permanent fissile material storage facility as the best way of ensuring that the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy will be dismantled as quickly and as safely as possible. The difficult is to quickly develop an integrated, long-term policy on the storage and ultimate disposition of fissile materials while taking advantage of what may prove to be an historic opportunity to facilitate the rapid and safe destruction of Soviet weapons.”
DOD Inspector General Audits
DOD Initiatives for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, 3/30/2007, DOD Inspector General
“DOD needs to coordinate the work of the 40 offices involved with combating weapons of mass destruction, clearly identify the use of more than $917 million budgeted in FY 2004 for 31 programs, consistently report on whether it accomplished the goals for combating weapons of mass destruction programs or explain why not, and propose legislation that provides for coordination with each Federal agency involved in combating weapons of mass destruction.”
Cooperative Threat Reduction: Management Structure of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 2/5/2003, DOD Inspector General
“The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics did not fulfill his responsibilities for managing the implementation and execution of CTR Projects. Although he established a position to oversee CTR implementation in July 2003, he needs to determine the appropriate staffing level for that office, fill those positions, and determine what management information is needed to fulfill the roles, responsibilities, and coordination requirements for CTR.”
Cooperative Threat Reduction Construction Projects, 12/18/2003, DOD Inspector General
“DOD could have better managed the risks associated with recent troubled projects (solid rocket fuel, liquid fuel, and chem disposal facilities) had it negotiated implementing agreements that better defined Russia’s requirements, thus making Russia more responsible. Management controls over the CTR Program were not adequate to ensure that facilities constructed to aid Russia in the storage and destruction of WMD were used for their intended purpose.”
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program: Solid Rocket Motor Disposition Facility Project, 9/11/2003, DOD Inspector General
“Negotiating an agreement with Russia on the disposal of solid rocket motors should ensure that DOD and Russia understand their respective commitments. DTRA could improve its management of CTR projects by including a risk mitigation strategy in written acquisition plans, implementing a milestone decision review and program baseline process, and ensuring that project managers maintain documentation of their actions. DTRA has taken several steps to reduce DOD risks in the execution of ongoing and future projects.”
Statement of Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Auditing on U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction and Non-Proliferation Programs, 3/4/2003, DOD Inspector General
Congressional testimony summarizing prior reports on the problems with DTRA’s solid and liquid rocket fuel disposal programs.
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Liquid Propellant Disposition Project, 9/302002, DOD Inspector General
“DTRA could reduce program risks by requiring a commitment from Russia to provide the weapon systems, provide adequate transparency rights to DOD, and remedies. Deciding the future of the facility could save more than $197,000 a month. DTRA could request that Russia use the proceeds from the sale of heptyl for CTR. The DTRA director could have more assurance that Russia will provide weapons systems for disposal by performing more complete inspections and identifying other potential uses for weapons to be disposed of.”
Management Costs Associated With the Defense Enterprise Fund, 12/31/2001, DOD Inspector General
“As a lessons learned, had statutory authority allowed DOD to incorporate cost principles for Federal grants into the grant agreement, the grants officer could have determined that management costs and expenses totaling at least $2.2 million to be unallocable, unallowable, or unreasonable.”
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 3/9/2001, DOD Inspector General
“The CTR Directorate program funds to facilitate the removal of WMD by enhancing the value of salvageable materials and developing commercial by-products. As a result, Russia and Ukraine could generate revenue of about $72.8 million without agreements on how the revenue should be used (finding A). The CTR Directorate did not establish adequate performance goals for the CTR Program. As a result, DTRA could not demonstrate that the CTR Directorate was executing the CTR Program efficiently and effectively or identifying opportunities to improve program effectiveness (finding B).”
Defense Enterprise Fund, 8/15/2000, DOD Inspector General
“The CTR Program Office could not effectively evaluate the status of the Defense Enterprise Fund or plan for the expiration of the grant agreement, and was not able to achieve planned objectives for self-sufficiency. We recommend that the Director use a standard review methodology and document the results of semi-annual progress review; establish measurable performance; update the long-range plan for self-sufficiency to reflect the current economic condition of the FSU; and develop an exit strategy for liquidating or selling the fund.”
Evaluation of the Defense Nuclear Agency’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Office, 10/12/1995, by DOD Inspector General
“Management should take action to better define the relative CTR roles and responsibilities between the Defense Nuclear Agency and the CTR Office within the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. We recommend the Director of DNA draft the CTR charter for both offices.”
Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union, 1/3/2008, by Amy F. Woolf
This report gives a brief overview of the DTRA CTR program, as well as related programs in DOE and the State Department. It then discusses legislative issues for CTR including: organization and coordination, access and transparency, liability protections and the Umbrella Agreement, certification, funding, and globalization and international cooperation.
India and Iran: WMD Proliferation Activities, 11/8/2006, Sharon Squassoni
“Members of Congress have questioned whether India’s cooperation with Iran might affect U.S. and other efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. India’s long relationship with Iran and its support of Non-Aligned Movement positions on nonproliferation are obstacles to India’s taking a hard line on Iran, yet the Bush Administration has asserted that U.S.-India nuclear cooperation would bring India into the “nonproliferation mainstream.” India does not support a nuclear weapons option for Iran. However, its views of the Iranian threat and appropriate responses differ significantly from U.S. views. Entities in India and Iran appear to have engaged in very limited nuclear, chemical and missile-related transfers over the years, and some sanctions have been imposed on Indian entities for transfers to Iran, the latest in July 2006.”
Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan, 2/17/2005, by Sharon Squassoni
“This paper describes why CTR programs developed for the FSU are considered models for assistance elsewhere and their potential application in India and Pakistan. The paper considers the types of assistance provided under CTR and potential constraints on U.S. assistance, including legal and political restrictions on cooperation with states outside the NPT; the low level of cooperation and transparency; lack of incentives; and potentially competing objectives of threat reduction and nuclear deterrence.”
Nuclear Terrorism, A Brief Review of Threats and Responses, 2/10/2005, by Jonathan Medalia
“The nations of greatest concern as potential sources of weapons or fissile materials are widely thought to be Russia and Pakistan. Russia has many tactical nuclear weapons, much HEU and weapons-grade plutonium, some said to have inadequate security. Many experts believe that technically sophisticated terrorists could, without state support, fabricate a nuclear bomb from HEU; opinion is divided on whether terrorists could make a bomb using plutonium. The fear regarding Pakistan is that some members of the armed forces might covertly give a weapon to terrorists or that, if President Musharraf were overthrown, an Islamic fundamentalist government or a state of chaos in Pakistan might enable terrorists to obtain a weapon. Terrorists might also obtain HEU from the more than 130 research reactors worldwide that use HEU as fuel.”
Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options, 7/2/2004, by Sharon Squassoni
“This report analyzes the range of possible applications of CTR fund, and describes legal, financial, technical, and political constraints on possible assistance. CTR programs cannot be precisely replicated in other countries. A common factor must be the willingness of such states to cooperate. Congress may wish to consider whether potentially expanding the geographic scope of CTR may have a negative effect on existing programs.”
Expanding Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs: Concepts and Definitions, 10/5/2004, by Amy F. Woolf
“Many have suggested that the US provide threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to nations outside the former Soviet Union. Some propose expanding assistance to contain proliferation; others support programs to stop terrorists from acquiring WMD. Some support assisting only those nations with WMD programs; others support assistance for any nation with WMD materials or knowledge. Some support assistance with the storage or elimination of weapons; others believe the US should “lock down” all WMD materials.”
Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet States, 4/10/2002, by Michelle Stem Cook and Amy F. Woolf
“The infrastructure of the Soviet/Russian BW complex was more extensive than most analysts realized. Cooperative projects at some bio centers have helped open doors to others. U.S. participants report that biosafety, biosecurity, and dismantlement projects require complex negotiations, engineering, and management specific to each center. Consequently, we may need to offer a long-term commitment to complete the effort. The interpersonal and institutional relationships resulting from these cooperative efforts may play a powerful role in preventing FSU proliferation.”
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress, 3/23/2001, by Amy F. Woolf
This report studies the differing opinions concerning CTR issues including: pace of implementation, accountability, value to US security, scope of CTR, Russia’s financial commitment, and linkage to other US assistance.
Other Government Reports
Albania Chemical Weapons Elimination Project (ACWEP), 10/14/2008, Brianne Tinsley of DTRA
Review the activities related to Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Albania Chemical Weapons Elimination Project
Defense Imperatives for the New Administration, 06/2008, Defense Science Board.
“This report describes those issues that the next Secretary of Defense should place at the top of the agenda- issues that will require the attention of the Commander-in-Chief, and if left unresolved, could lead to future military failure.”
Future Directions for DTRA Missions and Capabilities to Counter WMDCarter-Joseph Report), 3/20/2007, DOD
This is a FOIA exempt final report by the Carter-Joseph panel covering all DTRA mission areas for WMD, including the CTR program. “While CTR work in the former Soviet states should remain a priority, the program should refocus and expand to eliminate/reduce, consolidate, secure, and detect WMD and related materials worldwide. CTR should establish a quick reaction capability…coordinated/rationalized with the DOD Joint Elimination Capabilities Element. The DOD International Counterproliferation Program could be merged into CTR. MANPADS efforts should not be. DOD should streamline the CTR obligation.”
Global Challenge of WMD Terrorism, 2008, From the State Department Country Reports on Terrorism
“Since September 11, 2001, the international community has made significant strides in responding to the threat of WMD terrorism. States are working together bilaterally and multilaterally to address these threats and protect their populations. The United States has taken concrete measures to build a layered defense against the WMD terrorism threat. Through a variety of multinational initiatives such as the Global Partnership against the Spread of WMD, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the United States has taken a leadership role in reducing the threat of WMD in the hands of non-state actors and terrorists.”
DTRA Future of CTR Study (Carter-Joseph Interim Report), 12/2007, DOD
This is a FOIA exempt interim report by the Carter-Joseph panel focusing only on the CTR program. “The most significant required change to CTR is to refocus and expand it to other regions to help address today’s WMD proliferation and terrorism threats. This will require not only an expansion of CTR’s geographic reach, but also innovation in how it operates and its assessment of proliferation threats.”
DOD Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System FY07 Report, 2007, DOD
“The expansion of the Department of Defense Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (DOD-GEIS) continued in FY07. Increased infectious disease surveillance sites, augmented containment laboratory facilities, and coordination of laboratory methods across the military health system characterize the DOD-GEIS activities that support force health protection, the combatant commands, and the global medical community. DOD-GEIS continues to identify and address critical gaps in emerging infectious disease preparedness and to develop, with partners, solutions to address those vulnerabilities.”
Effective Multilateralism: The U.S. Strategy for Dealing with Global Nuclear, 11/14/2005, Andrew K Semmel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Address to the National Strategy Forum.
“I’d like to discuss three related aspects of the Administration’s approach to nuclear nonproliferation. I will first sketch out our overall strategy for meeting the threat posed by proliferation. Then, I’ll detail several of the President’s specific proposals to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. And, finally, I will consider the status of efforts to keep nuclear material safe and secure worldwide.” Cooperative Threat Reduction: The Way Ahead, 9/28/2005, CTR Director John C. Byrd This brief slideshow gives an overview of how and where CTR should evolve beyond the FSU. It notes that Russia is wealthier and less cooperative, and that new partners could include the Balkans, Cuba, and Central and Southeast Asia.
American Access to Russian Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites, 8/2003, Harold P. Smith Jr. (DTRA contractor)
Russian reluctance to give us access comes from “fear of intelligence collection, legal restrictions, lack of action on the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, military doctrine calling for forward deployment, resentment that NATO retained its tactical nuclear weapons, distrust of US and NATO foreign policy, resentment of American economic policy, bureaucratic inertia, and not least, and national pride. CTR should assign top priority to quickly closing or enhancing the security of the most vulnerable nuclear weapon storage sites, consolidating other sites, and seeking access to the rest.”
Administration Review Of Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance to the Russian Federation, Office of the President, 12/27/2001, Office of the Secretary of Defense
This fact sheet summarizes the results of the Bush administrations review of the various threat reduction and proliferation programs. It recommended the expansion of MCP&A, DOE’s Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency program, the International Science and Technology Center, and the redirection of bio scientists.
The Future of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program: a Study for DTRA Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 3/2001, DFI International (DTRA contractor)
“The study team found the CTR model could be applied effectively to DOD objectives beyond the current activities in the FSU. This expansion would be advisable vertically – to other activities within Russia such as sub dismantlement and biological weapons – as well as horizontally – to other countries such as North Korea, India, Pakistan, or former Yugoslavia. CTR could play a supporting role for the provisions of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or treaties mandating nuclear weapons free zones.”
An Assessment of Preventive Threat Reduction, 2/8/2001, Science Applications International Corporation (DTRA Contractor)
Proven and workable preventive threat reduction include: treaties, executive agreements, confidence and security building measures, consultative mechanisms, arrangements such as the CTR and MPC&A programs, and parallel unilateral actions. Objectives for future U.S.-Russian threat reduction are strategic nuclear reductions, enhanced nuclear materials and weapons security, and nuclear warhead dismantlement and controls. These will benefit from use of a mix of preventive threat reduction approaches. Future U.S. strategy will require far greater internal U.S. coordination and less stove-piping.
A Report Card on the DOE's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, 1/10/2001, The Russia Task Force commissioned by the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
The principal recommendation of this task for is that “the President, in consultation with Congress and in cooperation with the Russian Federation, should quickly formulate a strategic plan to secure and/or neutralize in the next eight to ten years all nuclear weapons-usable material located in Russia and to prevent the outflow from Russia of scientific expertise that could be used for nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.”
Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1/1/2001, Office of the Secretary of Defense
“The publication provides background on the NBC threat and U.S. progress toward countering that threat. The first section details the proliferation of NBC weapons and their delivery systems and the threat various nations pose. The second section describes the DOD coordinated, comprehensive strategy to combat the international threats posed by the proliferation and possible use of NBC weapons and their delivery systems.”
U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space, 07/1985, Office of Technology Assessment.
“This technical memorandum outlines the principal issues of the debate, the history of cooperation, and the experience of France, another country involved in space cooperation with the U.S.S.R.”
National Academy Reports:
The Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense, 2007, The National Academies
“The U.S. should provide sustained support for BTRP, and ensure integration of BTRP with related biological threat reduction activities of the government. BTRP should be transformed from assistance to a collaborative program of partnerships, built on strong international relationships. BTRP should give greater emphasis to a comprehensive, multifaceted approach to international engagement for achieving biosecurity, public health, and agriculture objectives. DOD/DTRA should ensure adequate staffing, and recognize that management can be more appropriately provided by U.S. government, academic, or nonprofit organizations than by contractors.”
Strengthening US-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation, 2005, The National Academies
This study offers the consensus findings and recommendations of a joint committee established by the U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences to identify methods of strengthening the cooperative nuclear nonproliferation programs of the United States and Russia. The study builds upon a previous joint effort of the two academies, a 2003 workshop to examine impediments to U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation.”
Overcoming Impediments to U.S-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop, 2004, The National Academies
“The National Academies of the United States and the Russian Academy of Sciences held a workshop at the IAEA. The report describes the context of and motivations for U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation; presents the histories and characteristics of programs that have patterns of success; describes existing impediments to cooperation, with analysis of these impediments elicited from the workshop; and presents options or strategies for addressing and mitigating impediments in the future.”
Trafficking Networks for Chemical Weapons Precursors: Lessons from the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, 11/2008, Jonathan Tucker of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.
“In addition to providing a detailed historical narrative of the cases, this paper describes the current U.S. system of dual-use export controls, indicates how it has changed since the 1980s, and identifies continuing gaps and weaknesses. The paper concludes with some recommendations to prevent the future trafficking of CW precursors.”
Issue Brief: Cooperative Threat Reduction and Pakistan, 08/04/2008, Sharad Joshi and Togzhan Kassenova for Monterey Institute for International Studies.
This issue brief juxtaposes conditions in the FSU and Pakistan and examines the prospects of CTR-type assistance for Pakistan.
Preliminary Findings: Ensuring Security in an Unpredictable World: The Urgent Need for National Security Reform, 07/2008, Project on National Security Reform
“Chapter I provides an overview of today’s national security challenges and tells the story of the need for national security reform” Chapter II provides a system-wide assessment of the problems that make the existing approach to national security unsuitable for current and future challenges. Chapter III uses a framework of system imperatives regarding the type of system required to present a synthesis of the critical findings of the project’s working groups.”
Case Studies: Volume 1, 2008, Project on National Security Reform.
The CSWG accordingly commissioned a diverse range of “major” and “mini” case studies to examine significant national security issues and incidents that involved multiple USG agencies and departments. This retrospective analysis seeks to discern the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. national security process, so as to better inform efforts to reform the current system.
Manufacturing Possibility: Expanding Resources to Meet Global Challenges, Promote Economic Development, Support Innovation, and Prevent Proliferation, 04/2008, Brian Finlay & Elizabeth Turpen of the Stimson Center
“Since the advent of the cooperative nonproliferation programs (CNP) in 1992, the efforts dedicated to addressing the human dimension of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat have been the least funded and most undervalued leg of the nonproliferation triad of weapons, materials, and expertise. This report highlights the potentially pivotal role of the private sector in helping to translate world-class weapons expertise into marketable research and successful business enterprise. As many states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) become more stable, there is a unique window of opportunity for spurring business investment in the interest of both economic development and nonproliferation goals.”
Impact of Scientific Developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention, 2008, Article by International Union of Pure and Applied Chemists in “Pure and Applied Chemistry”
“This report summarizes the findings and recommendations of an international workshop that was organized jointly by IUPAC and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and held in Zagreb, Croatia, from 22 to 25 April 2007. It was held to assist with preparation for the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It discusses technical challenges to the implementation of the CWC, protection against the effects of chemical weapons, opportunities in the field of international cooperation, and outreach.”
Explorations in Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation, 2008, G. Balachandra
“Challenges include the real Indian concern that the U.S. overlays genuine concerns with exaggerated scenarios to pursue hidden objectives, US domestic laws and current policies that do not allow for genuine dialogue between the two countries for a mutually satisfying resolution of the concerns, and the secrecy concerning some of these issues on part of India. The CTR programs of relevance to India include: Defense and Military, Emergency Response Support Equipment, Export Control, Guard Force Equipment and Training, Material Control and Accounting, Personnel Reliability Program, Security Assessment, Training and Logistics, Site Security Enhancements, and Weapons Transportation safety Enhancement.”
North Korean Rollback?, 11/14/2007, Elizabeth Turpen of Stimson Center
“First, "Cooperative Threat Reduction" can go well beyond addressing the immediate tasks of weapons and fissile materials. If applied comprehensively, it can also facilitate larger foreign policy goals related to economic development and rule of law. Second, without high-level attention to getting the job done, these endeavors can fall prey to pernicious bureaucratic behavior and interagency processes. Third, whereas weapons can be dismantled and materials put under lock-and-key, the people whose expertise contributed to those weapons cannot. These three lessons are all interrelated and need to be part of the transparent and sustainable disarmament of North Korea.”
The Nexus of Globalization and Next-Generation Nonproliferation: Tapping the Power of Market-Based Solutions, 11/1/2007, Ken Luongo and Isabelle Williams published in “Nonproliferation Review”
“Although globalization has created opportunities for nuclear and biological proliferation dangers to take root and grow, it also has opened the door to new solutions. Original ideas and approaches are needed to develop a stronger, more flexible next-generation nonproliferation strategy that accounts for the increasingly important integration of economic, political, and technological issues. The foundation of this strategy should focus on tapping the power of market-based mechanisms, understanding how commercially driven decisions affect proliferation threats, establishing new partnerships, and forging cohesion among the current nonproliferation mechanisms. The implementation of such a strategy will require forceful leadership, a cultural shift from both policymakers and the range of stakeholders, and consensus building within the international community.”
Non-State Actors and Nonproliferation: The NGO Role in Implementing UNSCR 1540, 8/6/2007, Elizabeth Turpen of Stimson Center
“The cooperative nonproliferation programs of the US Government and Global Partnership are a vastly underappreciated and underutilized toolkit for implementation of 1540. Without mutual agreement regarding the underlying threat or risk, the assistance rendered is not sufficiently valued by the recipient state to sustain the measures put in place. Most importantly and inextricably linked to mutual agreement, the third overarching lesson is that sustainability of nonproliferation assistance requires folding traditional development objectives of long-term institution and capacity-building into our nonproliferation approach. Lastly, "whole of government" responses are not available or even readily attainable to address complex, multifaceted issues such as the 1540 mandate.”
The Human Dimension is Key to Controlling Proliferation of WMD, 4/2007, Elizabeth Turpen of Stimson Center, published in “APS News”
“The maverick, innovative approaches in the early years of threat reduction that yielded rapid progress have long since given way to turf battles between agencies, insufficient high-level attention to lay the foundation for more intensive and expeditious cooperation, and congressional and bureaucratic propensities for muddling through, despite the continued risk of loose materials and unemployed weaponeers. Cooperative Threat Reduction is more than a group of programs to address supply-side concerns in the proliferation equation. If applied appropriately, Cooperative Threat Reduction can also address the demand-side aspects of the equation.”
25 Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terror, A Guide for Policymakers, 1/ 2007, Brian Finlay & Elizabeth Turpen of the Stimson Center
“The DOD should reevaluate its individual “country plans” to better integrate these with other DOD activities, as well as wider US Government objectives and programs; The CTR Directorate should establish a formal program whereby scientific detailees from other agencies augment any existing staffing shortfalls. In addition, there is a particular need for new permanent staff within the CTR Directorate with expertise in acquisition; DOD should move beyond the CTR Integrating Contract (CTRIC) model and make use of the various contract mechanisms that are available, including direct contracts with other US Government entities or with host nation firms, award/fee contracts, fixed-fee contracts, and incentive fees to address changing threats and opportunities on the ground; The White House and Congress should ensure that political commitments are followed up with the appropriate budgetary allocations to avoid a mismatch between promises and expectations within the host country; Congress should lift the legislated ceiling on annual maximum allowable increases on CTR budget line items; The DTRA public affairs office should assume a more proactive stance in hailing the successes of the CTR programs on Capitol Hill and to the media directly.“
Cooperation on Bioinitivatives in Russia and the NIS, Towards as True Partnership, 9/2006, Partnership for Global Security
“The U.S. and Russia, together with European and other international partners should aim to broaden their cooperation wherever possible, and promote the value of programs designed to enhance biological security to other regions of the world. Additional funding and support should be provided to address new bioproliferation prevention opportunities in, and beyond, the FSU. Effective engagement with at-risk biological facilities and scientists remains essential, and requires understanding of the U.S. bioproliferation programs’ goals and the specific interests of bio-institutes. Russia should work to finalize an implementation agreement with the U.S. to facilitate biosecurity activities.”
Cooperative Threat Reduction: Moving Beyond State Intent, 3/2006, Elizabeth Turpen of Stimson Center
“Operating in the space between ground-truth and the arms control commitments of a collapsed WMD-armed empire, CTR evolved into a robust, resilient and adaptable toolkit. CTR is not merely a set of programmes to manage supply-side risks; it should be viewed as the framework for ‘shaping the outcome’ through reciprocal commitments and incentives in pursuit of risk reduction. Furthermore, where state-centric arms control regimes lack the wherewithal to address concerns beyond a state’s intent, CTR can help bridge the gap. While there is no single silver bullet in the realm of non-proliferation, a robust international commitment to CTR provides a powerful means to “realistically improve the traditional regimes on the one hand and avoid the dangers of pure unilateralism or ad hoc measures on the other.”
The Future of Cooperative Threat Reduction, Charles Thornton of CSIS, 12/7/2005
This is a slide presentation to the South Korean Delegation at the Washington Seminar on Cooperative Threat Reduction. “Are we currently in a position to initiate major new policy? No. Dramatic changes in policy made only during formative moments. Therefore, the expansion of Threat Reduction must be evolutionary. There is too much focus on the transferability of specific projects as designed to be implemented in the FSU. It is better to focus on the transferability of the Nunn-Lugar principles as conceived in early post-Cold War era. One should remember the policy of incremental possibilities [BEACHHEAD PRINCIPLE]: Keep doors open, Adjust policies as needed, Build trust, and Hope.”
The Six Party Talks and Beyond: Cooperative Threat Reduction and North Korea, 12/2005, Center for Strategic and International Studies
“These programs would serve the interests of the United States as well as North. CTR could play an important role in the Beijing Six-Party Talks as well as any follow-on negotiations to deal with Pyongyang’s WMD. Moreover, they should be multilateral and closely involve countries such as South Korea and China who have very little previous experience with CTR. Practical steps need to be taken in the near-term to adequately prepare for the effective use of these measures starting with the Six-Party Talks These steps range from capacity-building in China and South Korea to preparing training courses for individuals likely to be working on the ground in the North. Moreover, the United States, by virtue of its past experience, technical capabilities and national interests, should play a leadership role.“
The Race to Secure Russia's Loose Nukes, Progress Since Sept 11, 9/2005, Brian Finlay of the Stimson Center and Andrew Grotto of the Center for American Progress
“The primary reasons for the failure to accelerate progress include intransigence on the part of the Russian government has complicated the full and effective implementation of these programs. Its stubbornness over allowing U.S. personnel sufficient access to sensitive sites to verify that cooperation has been especially disruptive. Poor leadership and an uneven commitment by the United States are also to blame. There is no clear, senior-level leadership in the United States responsible for coordinating and advancing American nuclear threat reduction objectives. The programs continue to suffer from insufficient and inconsistent budgetary support. And the United States has not done enough to address Russian sensitivities, especially with respect to which party bears liability in the event that an accident or sabotage occurs in the course of threat reduction work.“
An Ounce of Prevention, 3/2005, Ken Luongo and William Hoehn for the March/April Issue of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
“At a time when cooperative threat reduction desperately needs to expand, its programs are instead at risk. The threat reduction agenda now faces a potential crisis driven by mounting unsolved problems and lingering policy disputes. If new agreements are not reached and greater flexibility is not introduced soon, major elements of the agenda could be derailed.“
Next Generation Threat Reduction, Bioterrorism's Challenges and Solutions, 1/25/2005, New Defense Agenda
“Develop a stronger framework for sustained collaboration between the G-8 (Global Partnership/CTR Kananaskis Agreement), the European Union (ISTC/STCU) and the United States (Bio Industries Initiative); Encourage ethical codes of conduct for scientists working in sensitive bio-technologies sectors; Implement bio-safety and bio-security standards in order to increase the likelihood of competitive international engagement of Russia in bio-technologies and pharmaceutical sectors; Implement regional programmes to secure pathogens and consolidate dangerous pathogen collections; Increase partnership opportunities with bio-industries to keep scientists with bio-defence expertise well paid and engaged in research that is peaceful but also market-oriented, to reduce the risk of intellectual flight to nations of concern.“
Cooperative Threat Reduction for a New Era, 9/2004, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense UniversityThis broad report discusses the role of CTR in terms of overall national strategy and it past efforts. It then gives priorities for CTR to expand into the future, including techniques for CTR involvement in India and Pakistan, and the possibility for North Korea and Iran.
Eight Points on Cooperative Threat Reduction: A View from Russia, 8/2004, Alexander Pikayey of Russian Academy of Sciences
This brief paper gives a Russian history and overview of CTR. Concerning expansion, the author asks “whether the shift away from the former USSR might result in diversion of still inadequate resources from unfinished business in Russia. And second, whether the mechanisms established in the context of post-Soviet developments could work under very different circumstances at all.”
Expanding Cooperative Threat Reduction: Opportunities and Issues, 8/2004, Kenneth N. Luongo, RANSAC
These slides discuss the G-8 Global Partnership and its impact on the scope of CTR. It also discusses the challenges when expanding CTR, such as taking care not to overextend threat reduction activities or undermine its benefits and political support by applying the model to contexts where its success is unrealistic
Internationalizing and Expanding Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs, 8/2004, Maurizio Martellini of Landau Network-Centro Volta Italy
This brief paper discusses the viability of differing approaches to greater CTR internationalization, such as a clause in the Nonproliferation Treaty, bilateral agreements, or a dedicated treaty.
The Role of the EU in International Non-proliferation and Disarmament Assistance, 8/2004, Ian Anthony of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
This report discusses the scope of international assistance, EU approaches to the coordination of CTR, how EU projects are selected, and improving EU non-proliferation and disarmament assistance.
Prospects of Threat Reduction Measures in South Asia, 7/2004, R. Rajaraman of Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi“If the US wishes to cooperate with India on threat reduction it has to go beyond just non-proliferation and contribute towards reducing primary nuclear risks in the region. India, in particular, is not suffering from a financial crunch, is not a nuclear enemy of the US, and its scientists are a lesser proliferation risk. There may not be much motivation from either the US or India for CTR.”
Conceptual Approaches to Threat Reduction Expansion: Context and Principles, 7/2004, Charles L. Thornton of the University of Maryland“The expansion of CTR must be evolutionary, not dramatic. There is too much focus on copying projects specifically designed for the FSU. It’s better to focus on its founding principles. A policy of incremental possibilities: keep doors open, adjust policies, build trust, and hope more doors open.”
Adapting Cooperative Threat Reduction: Lessons from Iraq and Libya, 7/2004, Anne M. Harrington of the State Dept. Office of Proliferation Threat Reduction
“The 9/11 Commission Report found the government not structured to respond. We need greater timeliness and flexibility for all the involved agencies. The shift in emphasis from state threats to terrorist threat means that we must address proliferation at the individual expert level. We need to process/integrate lessons already learned in Iraq and Libya to redefine and redesign CTR.”
Forging Relationships, Preventing Proliferation: A Decade of Cooperative Threat Reduction in Central Asia, 7/2004, Emily Daughtry of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy
“CTR engagement deepened the relationships between the United States and central Asia. Each new project reinforces these relationships—and as new threats emerge, the countries will be better positioned to address them. The CTR program has contributed to U.S. homeland, regional and global security. CTR has proven flexible enough to address unanticipated threats, and at the same time maintained its primary focus on the dangers of proliferation. It has done so at minimal expense while yielding important side benefits. In an era obsessed with the control and elimination of WMD, CTR may prove to be an effective alternative to the more costly, more problematic resort to U.S. military force.”New Applications for the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program: Prospects and Opportunities, Charles Thornton, 3/20/2004
“What follows is a brief history of CTR and an analysis of its realization, followed by a discussion of CTR’s existing mechanics and an initial outlining of a general model. The essay concludes with several options for applying CTR programs in other contexts and the near-term possibilities of expanding the business model. Finally, it asks several open questions and offers a direction for the future evolution of this study.”
Russian Government Restructuring and the Future of WMD CTR, 3/2004, Matthew Bouldin of RANSAC
“On March 9, 2004 Vladimir Putin issued Presidential Order No. 314 that restructured the Russian “organs of executive power”. There were two significant changes. First, the number of ministries was reduced by about half. Second, three levels of executive organs were created (ministries, federal services, and federal agencies). These decisions could have significant implications for U.S. –Russian weapons of mass destruction threat reduction cooperation and impact the G-8 Global Partnership program.”
Reducing Threats at the Source: A European Perspective of Cooperative Threat Reduction, 2004, Ian Anthony of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
This report is to vast to summarize, but focuses on defining the threats CTR is to address, the necessity of overarching frameworks for agreements, and coordination of CTR across Europe and the G8.
Reform and Expansion of Cooperative Threat Reduction, 6/2003, Ken Luongo and William Hoehn in the June 2003 issue of Arms Control Today
Suggested ideas for expansion include “Rapid response to WMD emergency circumstances. Undertaking a program to develop alternative employment opportunities for scientists and workers previously engaged in Saddam Hussein’s WMD programs. Providing export control development and nuclear MPC&A assistance to India and Pakistan. Resuming a dialogue on MPC&A cooperation with China and expanding cooperative U.S.-Sino WMD interdiction and anti-smuggling efforts. Assisting India in its commitment to eliminate its chemical weapons arsenal. Extending personnel reliability systems to Pakistan and India to effectively screen guard forces with access to warheads and sensitive materials. Contingency planning to assist dismantlement of North Korean nuclear weapons and disposal of related materials. ”
Reshaping U.S.–Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade, 11/2002, RANSAC–Carnegie Endowment joint working group
“Much of the threat reduction agenda remains to be completed. Political support for threat reduction activities remains insufficient. Threat reduction lacks a coordinated strategy. Threat reduction’s future results may be less tangible. Financing for some key threat reduction activities is inadequate. Financing is not the only impediment to threat reduction progress. Access to facilities and transparency of information are essential. The economic dimensions of threat reduction are not well understood. Reemployment programs for scientists require new strategies. The arms control–threat reduction relationship needs to be better defined.”
Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia, 4/2002, Nonproliferation Policy Education CenterThis report summarizes part of a year-long study on the future of U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation. It recommends: the US and Russia deploy a joint disease monitoring; Russia should be paid for receiving U.S.-origin spent reactor fuel from other nations in exchange of a more detailed nuclear materials inventory; the US, EU and Russia cooperate more extensively on student exchanges, CTR programs are privatized to the extent possible.
Viewpoint: Prisms and Paradigms, Spring 2002, Michael Krepon article in Nonproliferation Review
In this viewpoint, Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center argues that in the era of asymmetric warfare, the United States must develop a new central organizing principle for its national security policy. He proposes cooperative threat reduction as a new strategic concept, urging that it be included with deterrence, diplomacy, and superior military capabilities as a central instrument of U.S. national security policy. The potential of cooperative threat reduction is far greater than is commonly understood, concludes Krepon, and can make a major contribution to addressing the dangerous world of asymmetric threats.
Moving from MAD to Cooperative Threat Reduction, 12/2001, Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center
“Cooperative threat reduction is more than an aggregation of government initiatives; it is the positive strategic concept we need to keep dangerous weapons and materials out of the hands of terrorists or their state sponsors. The US nuclear arsenal and missile defenses aren’t helpful against these challenges and updated concepts of deterrence will fail unless accompanied by cooperative threat reduction. Nuclear deterrence does not progressively reduce and eliminate dangerous weapons and materials; cooperative threat-reduction programs do. Our new strategic concept is ideally suited not just to deal with the demise of the Soviet Union, but also with the rise of asymmetric warfare.”
Options for Increased U.S.-Russian Nuclear Nonproliferation Cooperation and Projected Costs, 10/2001, RANSAC executive director Ken Luongo
The options assessed in this analysis are to “Expand Fissile Material and Warhead Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A), Improve Russian and FSU Border and Export Controls, Downsize Nuclear Cities and Prevent Proliferation via Brain Drain, Facilitate Fissile Material Disposition and Elimination, Promote Warhead and Fissile Material Stockpile Monitoring and Transparency”.
Renewing the Partnership: Recommendation for Accelerated Efforts to Secure FSU Nuclear Material, 8/ 2000, Oleg Bukharin, Matthew Bunn, and Ken Luongo of RANSAC
“This report provides an assessment of the current MPC&A program and makes recommendations designed to accelerate and strengthen the effort, including steps toward the difficult goal of achieving sustainable security for nuclear material in the former Soviet Union over the long term.”
Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes, 12/1999, Amy E. Smithson of the Stimson Center
“The report recommends at least doubling the amount of money going annually into collaborative research grants for biological weaponeers and at a minimum tripling the grant funds for chemical weapons scientists. Russia must clean house of the hardline holdovers from the Soviet days who want to perpetuate a weapons capability and their own personal influence. The ISTC should reduce the inordinate delays in the approval of research grants. Washington needs to create an overall architecture for brain drain programming, insulate these programs and other CTR efforts from politics, and repeal the blanket prohibition on use of U.S. funds for defense conversion.”
Transforming the Russian Nuclear Weapons Complex: The Role of NGO's, 6/1999, RANSAC
“On June 22 and 23, 1999, RANSAC convened a meeting in Washington, D.C. titled, Transforming the Russian Nuclear Weapon Complex: The Role of Non-Governmental Institutions. This meeting brought together over fifty experts in the economic development, nonproliferation, and the energy and environmental fields to identify substantive ideas and activities that could be conducted on a second, nongovernmental track in support of U.S.- Russian government and international efforts to downsize and redirect the Russian nuclear weapon complex and reduce the nuclear proliferation danger in Russia. The meeting resulted in a list of over 20 significant activities that could be developed or implemented by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)”.
Fostering Cooperation in Nonproliferation Activities, 12/2007, Jason Bock, Naval Postgraduate School.
“This thesis used both statistical and case study analysis to examine five variables which might positively
influence international cooperation in the following nonproliferation/counterproliferation activities: the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. The five variables were security assistance, alliances, international organizations, domestic politics, and economic freedom.”
Russian-American Security Cooperation After St. Petersburg: Challenges and Opportunities, 04/2007, Richard Weitz, Strategic Studies Institute.
“This monograph assesses the opportunities for further security cooperation between Russia and the United States, offering detailed policy suggestions in certain areas.”
United States and Russian Cooperation on Issues of Nuclear Nonproliferation, 05/2005, Daniel Speer, Naval Postgraduate School.
“This thesis summarizes and analyzes the key factors in the cooperative U.S-Russian effort, pre- and post- 9/11, to prevent nuclear proliferation. Especially highlighted are pertinent efforts to prevent terrorist organizations from obtaining nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons capabilities.”
An Overview of the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program for Biological Warfare Agents in the Former Soviet Union, 03/18/2005, Colonel Kathleen Carr, U.S. Army War College.
“This paper will describe the overarching CTR guidance, US policy for BW counterproliferation in Russia and select states of the FSU, the interagency role in BW CTR, the challenges facing the BW CTR and recommendations for facilitating an effective counterproliferation program for the FSU's BW program.”
Military Strategy for Combating Nuclear Proliferation, 03/18/2005, Lieutenant Colonel Brent Bredhoft, Army War College.
“This paper reviews the U.S. national-level strategy for combating nuclear weapons, defines the supporting military strategy, and analyzes the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of the military objectives (ends), concepts (ways), and resources (means) in meeting the national security objectives”
U.S. Russian Cooperation Against Nuclear Proliferation, 9/2004, Samuel Shearer, Naval Postgraduate School.
“Following the Cold War their cooperative relationship changed as Washington began treating Moscow as an unequal partner and their nonproliferation efforts broke down into a cooperative and uncooperative mix. This mix has reduced the effectiveness of their efforts and may accelerate proliferation. The September 11th terrorist attacks put more attention on the nuclear proliferation threat to the international community. If this threat is to be minimized, Washington and Moscow need to work together, as they did against China, to prevent new nuclear powers from emerging.”
U.S. Assistance in the Destruction of Russia’s Chemical Weapons, 12/2000, Eric Mostoller, Naval Postgraduate School.
“The thesis examines the present status of Russia’s chemical weapons destruction program, which is to be implemented according to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. It assesses the magnitude of the challenges in destroying the world’s largest chemical weapons stockpile.”
The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and Russian-American Relations in the Late 1990’s: Power vs. Institutions, 05/2000, Brent Weaver, University of Virginia
“The paper is presented in four major parts beginning with the introductory scenario and premises. Part two presents the history of Russia-American relations from 1995-1999 together with a brief analysis of the trends and casual factors therein. Next, part three similarly examines the track record of CTR throughout the same time period, introducing institutional theory and epistemic communities as they pertain to the transnational contacts embedded within the institution of CTR. Finally part four concludes with findings and recommendations.”
Cooperative Threat Reduction, 04/1997, Jeff Webb, Army War College.
“CTR addresses a whole range of possibilities and assists in the destruction of active systems which are designed to destroy the U.S. CTR has been successful in helping reduce the nuclear weapons delivery systems, through providing destruction equipment and dismantlement help.”
National Defense Authorization Act Summary FY 2009, H.R. 5658
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008, H.R. 1585, 01/04/2007
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY07, P.L. 109-364, 10/17/2006
National Defense Authorization Act for FY06, P.L. 109-163, 01/06/2006
Cooperative Proliferation Detection and Interdiction Assistance Act of 2006, S. 2566, 04/06/2006
“To provide for coordination of proliferation interdiction activities and conventional arms disarmament, and for other purposes”
Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, P.L.108-375, 10/28/2004
National Defense Authorization Act for FY04, H.R.1588, 01/07/2003
Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for FY03, P.L. 107-314, 12/2/2002
National Defense Authorization Act for FY02, P.L. 107-107, 12/28/2001
National Defense Authorization Act for FY01, P.L. 106-398, 10/30/2000
National Defense Authorization Act for FY00, P.L. 106-65, 10/5/1999
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, P.L. 105-261, 10/17/1998
National Defense Authorization Act for FY98, P.L. 105-85, 11/18/1997
National Defense Authorization Act for FY97, P.L. 104-201, 9/23/1996
National Defense Authorization Act Conference Report on the FY97 P.L. 104-201, 9/23/1996
“The conferees agree to a series of provisions that address all aspects of the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The conferees agree to recommend an additional $201.0 million to the budget to address this issue. These increased funds would: increase the budget request for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program by $37.0 million; authorize a $10.0 million increase to the budget request for the counterproliferation support program; authorize $30.0 million for U.S. and international border security activities; add $65.0 million for the establishment of a domestic emergency response program; and add $57.0 for DOE materials, protection, control and accountability.”
National Defense Authorization Act for FY96, P.L. 104-106. 02/10/1996
Conference Report on the FY96 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, House Report 104-334, 11/15/1995
“Although no new funds are provided for the Defense Enterprise Fund, the conferees agree that up to $2,000,000 of previously appropriated funds may be expended to administer the continued operation of the Defense Enterprise Fund program currently underway. The conferees have included two general provisions regarding the Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction program involving the limitation on expenditures of funds for the Chemical Weapons Destruction program and a prohibition on providing funds for housing for current or former Soviet military officers.”
National Defense Authorization Act of 1995, P.L. 103-337, 10/5/1994
“The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on progress being made in each state of the former Soviet Union that is a recipient of assistance under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs toward the development of an effective system of control and accountability for material related to weapons of mass destruction in that country. Officials of the United States and of the recipient country should have an accurate accounting of the weapons of mass destruction in that country and the fissile and chemical materials from those weapons.”
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993, P.L. 103-160, 11/30/1993
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may conduct programs described in subsection (b) to assist the independent states of the former Soviet Union in the demilitarization of the former Soviet Union. Any such program may be carried out only to the extent that the President determines that the program will directly contribute to the national security interests of the United States.”
The Freedom Support Act, P.L. 102-511, 10/24/1992.
“The Congress finds that it is in the national security interest of the United States-- to facilitate, on a priority basis-- the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction of the independent states of the former Soviet Union; the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and destabilizing conventional weapons, and the establishment of verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons; the prevention of diversion of weapons-related scientific expertise; and to expand military-to-military contacts between the United States and the independent states.”
Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992, P.L. 102-484, 10/23/1992.
“The programs referred to in subsection (a) are limited to-- transporting, storing, safeguarding, and destroying nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of the independent states of the former Soviet Union; establishing verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons and their components; facilitating the demilitarization of the defense industries of the former Soviet Union and the conversion of military technologies and capabilities into civilian activities; establishing science and technology centers in the independent states of the former Soviet Union.”
Soviet Threat Reduction Act of 1991, H.R. 3807, P.L. 102-228, 11/27/1991
“The program under this section shall be limited to cooperation among the United States, the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor entities to (1) destroy nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and other weapons, (2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction, and (3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Estimates: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 02/2008
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Estimates: Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 02/2008
Preliminary Analysis of the U.S. DOD’s CTR Budget Request, Raphael Della Ratta, PGS
Analysis of the U.S. DOE’s International Nonproliferation Budget Request, Jennifer Lacey, PGS
Analysis of the U.S. State Department’s Budget Request for Global WMD Threat Reduction Programs, Jennifer Lacey, PGS
Analysis of the U.S. DOD’s CTR Budget, Isabelle Williams, PGS
Analysis of the U.S. DOE’s International Nonproliferation Budget Request, Isabelle Williams & Kenneth Luongo, PGS
Preliminary Analysis of the U.S. State Department’s Budget Request for Global WMD Threat Reduction Programs, Isabelle Williams, PGS
Preliminary Analysis of the DOD CTR Budget Request, William Hoehn, RANSAC
Preliminary Analysis of the U.S. DOE’s Nonproliferation Budget Request, William Hoehn, RANSAC
Preliminary Analysis of the U.S. State Department’s Budget Request for Global WMD Threat Reduction Programs, William Hoehn, RANSAC
Preliminary Analysis of the U.S. State Department’s Budget Request for Nonproliferation Programs in Russia and the FSU, William Hoehn, RANSAC
Observations on the President’s Budget Request for Nonproliferation Programs in Russia and the Former Soviet Union, William Hoehn, RANSAC
The Clinton Administration’s Budget Requests for Nuclear Security Cooperation with Russia, William Hoehn, RANSAC
A Reliance on Smart Power – Reforming the Foreign Assistance Bureaucracy, 07/31/2008, Gordan Adams testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Colombia.
Dr. Adams testimony focuses on, “How do we ensure that our foreign policy toolkit is properly balanced, strategically integrated, and adequately funded to be effective in dealing with these challenges.”
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs: Statement for the Record, 04/02/2008, Joseph Benkert before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats Capabilities.
“Since September 11, 2001, we have made significant progress. I think that CTR and PSI are key examples of that progress. PSI, of course, did not exist in 2001, and CTR was a different program. Despite the good work that has been done by CTR and PSI, we have much more to do across the spectrum of WMD threats before we can testify with confidence that all of our government’s tools to combat WMD are being integrated fully and effectively”
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs: Statement for the Record, 04/11/2007, Joseph Benkert before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats Capabilities.
“The eight missions identified in the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD represent a continuing challenge for us. They are complex because the threat is complex; the next edition of this strategy document could change in important ways, because the WMD threat will change. As it does, we are prepared to make changes in programs like CTR. The same is true for PSI, though this activity is still new enough that we ought not begin speaking of significant changes just yet.”
New Initiative in Cooperative Threat Reduction, 02/09/2006, Robert Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Statement before the Senate foreign Relations Committee.
“A discussion on the role of the State Department in implementing the President’s strategy against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as in reducing the threat of dangerous conventional arms.”
REPORTS TO CONGRESS
Report on Program Activities for Facilitation of Weapons Destruction and Nonproliferation in the Former Soviet Union.
Semi-Annual Report on Program Activities to Facilitate Weapons Destruction and Nonproliferation
Semi-Annual Report on CTR
Cooperative Threat Reduction Multi-Year Program Plan
Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress
Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report: Briefing to the Staffs of the Armed Services Committees
Report on Proposed Obligations for Facilitating Weapons Destruction and Nonproliferation in the Former Soviet Union